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LIQUIDATIONS AND REINCORPOBATIONS-BEFORE
AND AFTER DAVANT
ROLAND L. HJORTH*
Liquidations and reincorporations have been utilized in attempts
to bail out corporate earnings and profits at capital gains rates.
The success of these attempts has been limited by judicial extension
of the corporate reorganization sections of the Internal Revenue
Code. Professor Hjorth suggests that specific Congressional amend-
ment of section 331 to encompass the liquidation reincorporation
problem is preferable to extension of the reorganization provisions
which occurred in the recent case of Davant v. Commissioner.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Disputes relating to liquidations and reincorporations usually con-
cern proper classification of a corporate distribution. The recipient of
normal distributions by going corporations must treat the amounts
received as ordinary dividend income if the corporation has sufficient
earnings and profits. The recipient of a distribution made in complete
liquidation of a corporation, on the other hand, need only treat the
excess of the amount received over his stock basis as income, and that
income will usually be a capital gain. A distribution of "boot"
pursuant to a qualified corporate reorganization is subject to still
another set of rules: the boot is taxed only to the extent that gain is
realized, but the gain can be taxed as ordinary income to the extent that
the distributing corporation has earnings and profits. In a liquidation
and reincorporation controversy, the chief problem is not whether the
distribution comes out of earnings and profits, but rather whether the
distribution is (a) made in complete liquidation, (b) made pursuant to
a reorganization, or (c) a normal distribution by a going corporation.
The substantive differences between normal, liquidating and reorgan-
ization distributions might be summarized as follows: In a normal dis-
tribution by a going corporation, the distribution does not affect the
corporation's continued existence, does not alter the capital structure
of the corporation, and ordinarily does not alter significantly each
shareholder's relative ownership of corporate stock.' A distribution in
complete liquidation, on the other hand, terminates the corporation's
existence; if the business is continued by the shareholders, it is not
carried on in corporate form, or if carried on in corporate form by a
different corporation, it is not carried on by a corporation controlled by
'See Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U.S. 233 (1928).
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shareholders of the old corporation.2 Finally, where a distribution is
made pursuant to a reorganization, the business continues to be carried
on either by the same corporation but with a different capital structure,
or by a different corporation "controlled" by the shareholders of the
old corporation or corporations.'
There are also numerous formal distinctions between normal, liqui-
dating, and reorganization distributions. The issue in most liquidation
and reincorporation cases has been whether a distribution which meets
the formal requirements of a liquidating distribution is in substance
either (i) a reorganization distribution even though the formal re-
quirements for a reorganization are not present or (ii) a normal dis-
tribution by a going corporation even though the formal conditions
required in either a liquidating distribution or a reorganization distri-
bution are met. Courts have shown remarkable ingenuity in finding
2
"[In order to have a complete liquidation] the corporation must have ceased to
be a going corporate concern, or if the enterprise is continued in corporate form, the
shareholder must have disassociated himself from it." Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner,
345 F.2d 35, 41 (4th Cir. 1965) (dictum).
"[The] essence of [a statutory reorganization] is a continuance of the proprietary
interests in the continuing enterprise under modified corporate form, the transaction
being deemed insufficiently closed economically to justify a tax at the time, except
in so far as the stockholder gets something in addition to stock or securities in the
reorganized company." Darrell, The Scope of Commissioner v. Bedford's Estate, 24
TAxEs 266, 272 (1946) (quoted with approval in Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d
646, 648 (lst Cir. 1949)).
The principle purpose of the reorganization provisions is to provide nonrecogni-
tion in certain corporate adjustments where the shareholder realizes a "paper gain"
but does not take his investment out of corporate solution. PAUL, StUDIEs IN FEDERAL
TAXATION 3, 4-7 (3d Ser. 1940); Peterson, Corporate Distributions and Adjust-
men ts: A General Survey, 3 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG.,
IST SEss. TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAX BASE
1613-1616 (Comm. Print 1958). Additional purposes are listed in Goldman, Revised
"Reincorporation Doctrine" Upsets Planners; Rev. Rul. 61-156 Analyzed, 17 J.
TAXATION 148, 151 (1962), where the author states that Subchapter C "treats reorgan-
izations specially in order to ... prevent converting earnings withdrawals into
capital gains instead of dividends unless the recipient stockholder is ending his
participation in the venture and bar stepping up the basis of corporate property
in which the old stockholders retain a substantial equity interest so as to prevent,
among other things, double depreciation deductions."
For purposes of the reorganization sections, "control" means ownership of at
least 80% of the total number of shares of outstanding voting stock aid at least 80%
of the total number of all other outstanding shares of a corporation. INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, §368(c). Despite its liberality in finding a type D reorganization even
where the transaction does not conform to the literal requirements of the statutory
definition, the Tax Court has applied § 368(c) literally and has refused to find a D
reorganization where "control" has been lacking. See Austin Transit, Inc., 20 T.C.
849 (1953) (stockholders of the liquidating corporation acquired 69% of the stock of
the new corporation, the remaining 31%, being held by friendly interests) ; Hyman H.
Berghash, 43 T.C. 743 (1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir., 1966) (shareholder of the
liquidating corporation acquired 50% of the shares of the new corporation and an
option to purchase the remainder, exercisable after dismissing the other shareholder
from employment) ; Turner Advertising of Kentucky, Inc. v. Commissioner, ff 66,101
P-H Tax Ct. Mee. (1966) (shareholders of transferor corporation owned all stock
except stock purchased by employees and subject to right of first refusal).
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reorganizations even when transactions do not literally conform to the
reorganization definitions contained in section 368.1 While courts have
been reluctant to subject distributions in liquidation and reincorpora-
tion transactions to the rigors of section 301, the recent case of Davant
v. Commissioner' indicates that courts may be overcoming this reluc-
tance. A proper appreciation of the Davant case requires preliminary
consideration of the forms reincorporations have taken in the past.
II. REINCORPORATIONs-SOME FoRs AND PURPOSES
The precise forms which reincorporations may take are legion.6
Several common types are described below, with a statement of tax
consequences that would result if, but only if, the distributions were
treated as distributions in complete liquidation not pursuant to a
qualified reorganization and not taxable as a normal distribution by a
going corporation.
(1) "Liquidation-Reincorporation." Operating assets, including de-
preciable personal and real property, together with liquid assets, are
distributed by a corporation to its shareholders in complete liquida-
tion. The shareholders retain the liquid assets and transfer the
operating assets to a new corporation in return for all the stock of
the new corporation.
' Discussions of the liquidation and reincorporation problem may be found in
Bakst, Does Dissolution Followed by Reincorporation Constitute a Reorganization?
33 TAXES 815 (1955); Goldman, Revised "Reincorporation Doctrine" Upsets Plan-
ners; Rev. Rid. 61-156 Analyzed, 17 J. TAXATION 148 (1962); Grubb, Corporate
Manipulations Under Subchapter C: Reincorporation-Liquidation, 28 U. CINc. L.
REv. 304 (1959); Kuhn, Liquidation and Reincorporation Under the 1954 Code,
51 GEo. L.J. 96 (1962) ; Lane, The Reincorporation Game: Have The Ground Rules
Really Changed? 77 HARv. L. RFv. 1218 (1964) ; MacLean, Problems of Reincorpora-
tion and Related Proposals of the Subchapter C Advisory Group, 13 TAX L. REv.
407 (1958); Morrison, The Line Between Liquidations and Reorganizations. 41
TAXES 785 (1963) ; Nicholson, Recent Developments it the Reincorporation Area,
19 TAX L. REv. 123 (1964); Rice, When Is a Liquidation Not a Liquidation For
Federal Income Tax Purposes? 8 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1956); Schwartz, Reincorpor-
ations Under the 1954 Code, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 159 (1962); Whitaker, Liquidation
and Reincorporation, in U. So. CAL. 1966 TAX INST. 191. The articles by Rice (for
discussion of developments under 1939 Code and introduction to 1954 Code), Lane,
(for discussion of development under 1954 Code through the landmark decision of
Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962)) and Whitaker (for discussion of cases
following Gallagher) are specially recommended.
r366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), affirming in part and reversing in part South
Texas Rice Warehouse Co., 43 T.C. 540 (1965).
'See Rice, supra note 4, at 219-22. MacLean, supra note 4, places liquidation and
reincorporation transactions into two basic categories: (1) transfer to a controlled
corporation followed by a liquidation of the transferor and (2) liquidation followed
by a transfer of operating assets to a new corporation. Rice adds a transaction
whereby one corporation "sells" assets to a sister corporation and then distributes all
its assets in complete liquidation. See also Grubb, supra note 4, at 308-09.
[ VOL.. 42 :737
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Under section 331, the shareholders would recognize a long term capital
gain measured by the difference between their adjusted bases in their
shares and the value of all property received.7 The shareholders' basis
in the property received would be its value on the date of distribution
and this would also be the basis of the new corporation in the property.
If the transaction resulted in an increased basis in the operating assets,
the new corporation could take larger depreciation deductions on the
depreciable property than could the old corporation. Obtaining a
stepped-up depreciation base at capital gains rates was at one time a
principal advantage hoped to be gained from reincorporations. The
liquidating corporation would ordinarily recognize no income,8 except
as provided by sections 1245 and 1250.' The new corporation would
commence operations with no earnings and profits.
(2) "Preincorporation-Liquidation." A corporation with liquid as-
sets and operating assets transfers its operating assets to a new
corporation ("the transferee") in return for all the stock of the
transferee. The transferor corporation then distributes all its assets,
including the stock of the transferee, to its shareholders in complete
liquidation.
Under section 351, the old corporation recognizes no gain on the trans-
fer of its operating assets to the transferee, even if the operating assets
consist of depreciable real and personal property as defined in sections
'Under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 331, the distribution is treated as being "in full
payment in exchange for the stock." Long-term capital gain treatment would require
that the stock be a capital asset in the shareholder's hands, and that it have been held
for him for more than six months. For a general discussion, see Hjorth, An
Introduction to Capital Gains and Losses, 41 WAsH. L. REv. 764 (1966).
This article is concerned primarily with attempts to pull out accumulated earnings
and profits of a corporation at capital gain rates and to reduce the corporation's
earnings and profits account to zero, but there are many other tax advantages involved
in sections 331 and 346. See BrrTKER & EusTicE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 569-570 (2d ed. 1966).
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 311, 336; General Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering,
296 U.S. 200 (1935). "While no statutory counterpart for section 311 appears in
the 1939 Code, certain court decisions have been considered to hold that a corporation
realizes no gain or loss upon a distribution of property to its shareholders. Section
311 incorporates this general rule...." S. RPp. No. 1622 to accompany H.R. REP.
8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 247 (1954). The general rule does not apply to distributions
except in their capacity as such (i.e., the rule would not apply to distributions to
satisfy wage claims), nor does it apply to distributions of certain LIFO inventory
or to distributions of property subject to liabilities in excess of basis. See INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §311(b) & (c). Distributions of property described in INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1245, 1250 are governed by those sections rather than § 311.
0 INT. RE1v. CODE OF 1954 §§ 1245, 1250. See Rice, supra note 4, at 208-10. Sec-
tions 1245 and 1250 take precedence over any other provision appearing in the Code.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1245(d), 1250(h). The sections by their own terms
do not apply to distributions under §332 (liquidations of controlled subsidiaries),
§ 351 (transfers to controlled corporations), § 361 (transfers pursuant to a plan of
reorganization), but do apply to distributions in complete liquidation and sales
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1245 and 1250.10 Under section 331, each shareholder realizes a capital
gain equal to the difference between his adjusted basis in his shares and
the aggregate value of the cash, liquid assets and stock of the new
corporation received by him. The results are similar to those in a
liquidation-reincorporation transaction except that the old corporation
recognizes no gain on the transfer of the depreciable property and the
new corporation receives no stepped-up basis in the property trans-
ferred to it."
(3) "Sale-Liquidation" or "Practical Merger." One shareholder
owns two corporations, both having substantial liquid assets and
operating assets. The first corporation adopts a plan of complete
liquidation to be effected within one year and sells all its operating
assets to the second corporation, retaining its cash and liquid assets.
The first corporation then distributes all its assets, including those
acquired from the second corporation, to its shareholders in com-
plete liquidation. If the consideration received from the second
corporation consists of cash and liquid assets, the shareholder can
milk the profits out of two corporations in one transaction.12
that might otherwise qualify for nonrecognition of gain under § 337. Under § 1245,
applying to most depreciable property used in the trade or business other than real
property, all post-1961 depreciation deductions recaptured in a sale or exchange are
taxed as ordinary income. If, for example, § 1245 property with a basis of $100 and
a value of $1,000 is distributed in complete liquidation, and if post-1961 depreciation
deductions allowable to the corporation amount to $500, the liquidating corporation
recognizes ordinary income in the amount of $500, notwithstanding the provisions
of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 336. The same rule would apply if the property were
sold by the corporation pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation to be effected
within one year, notwithstanding the provisions of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 337.
Similar rules apply to sales or distributions of depreciable real property, except
that § 1250 applies only to post-1963 depreciation allowances and applies only to
"additional" depreciation, which can range all the way from all depreciation (if the
property has been held one year or less), to none of the depreciation if the property
is held for more than ten years. The adoption of these two sections will eventually
eliminate tax advantages attributable to obtaining a stepped-up basis in § 1245
assets by means of liquidations and reinorporations. There will still be an advantage
in receiving a stepped-up basis in § 1250 assets, depending upon how long the § 1250
assets were held. The tax advantage inheres in the fact that depreciation deductions
may be deducted from ordinary income. If the liquidation and reincorporation
transaction is taxed under § 331, the depreciated basis may be "stepped-up" to the
market value of the asset at the cost of a capital gains tax unless § 1245 or § 1250
intervenes to tax the recaptured depreciation at ordinary income rates. Whitaker, supra
note 4, at 193 states that the addition of §§ 1245 and 1250 "have largely eliminated the
capital gains opportunities [in liquidation and reincorporation transactions] in
connection with depreciable assets." For a brief discussion of the application of
§§ 1245 and 1250, see Hjorth, supra note 7, at 781-86. For an extensive discussion,
see Horvitz, Sections 1250 and 1245: The Puddle and the Lake, 20 TAx L. REv.
285 (1965).
10 Sections 1245 and 1250 do not apply to transfers qualifying under § 351. INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1245(b) (3), 1250(d) (3).
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 358(a).
'This may be illustrated by an example. Assume that one shareholder owns two
corporations, each with substantial earnings and profits, and each having operating
C VOL. 42: 737
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If the sale to the second corporation is made after the adoption of a
plan qualifying under section 337,13 the first corporation recognizes no
gain on the sale of its operating assets except that where the assets
consist of depreciable property, gain would be recognized to the extent
provided in sections 1245 and 1250. The shareholder would realize
a capital gain equal to the difference between his adjusted basis in
his shares and the aggregate value of assets received. The buying
corporation would get a stepped-up basis in the property purchased by
it. The earnings and profits account of the buying corporation would
not be affected by the transaction. 4 The earnings and profits account
of the selling corporation would disappear.
(4) "Division-Liquidation." One corporation conducts two separate
businesses and has substantial liquid assets. It transfers the oper-
ating assets of one business to Corporation X and the operating
assets of the second business to Corporation Y in return for all the
stock of Corporations X and Y. It then distributes the stock of
Corporation X and Corporation Y, plus the liquid assets retained
by it, to its shareholders in complete liquidation. In one variant of
the same transaction, a corporation conducting two separate bus-
inesses might distribute all its assets in complete liquidation, the
shareholders retaining the liquid assets and transferring the assets
of each business to a separate new corporation. In a second variant
of the same transaction, one shareholder might own the stock of
three corporations, viz., Corporations A, B and C. Corporation B
conducts two separate businesses. It adopts a plan of complete
liquidation to be effected within one year, sells the assets of one
business to A and the assets of the second business to C for stock,
notes or cash and distributes all its assets (including the acquired
stock, notes or cash) to its shareholders in complete liquidation.
It can be seen that all division-liquidations are merely variants of pre-
viously described types, except that the operating assets of the li-
assets worth $500 and $500 in cash. The first corporation sells its assets to the
second and distributes $1,000 in complete liquidation. If § 337 applies to the sale,
the selling corporation recognizes no gain on the transaction. The cash of both
corporations winds up in the hands of the shareholder.
Virginia Ice and Freezing, Inc., 30 T.C. 1251 (1958).
A possible variant of the transaction could occur where the sole shareholder of
two corporations causes the second corporation to purchase his stock in the first.
However, under INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 304 this would be treated as a redemption
by the second corporation of its own stock and would be treated as a distribution
under § 301 unless the redemption qualifies as an exchange under § 302.
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quidating corporation are transferred to two new corporations instead
of one.
In most reincorporation cases, the taxpayer has sought the tax con-
sequences described above. The Commissioner has sought to cate-
gorize the transactions as reorganizations and to tax property taken
out of corporate solution either as a distribution of "other property"
under section 356 or as a dividend under section 301.
III. REINCORPORATIONS AND REORGANIZATIONS-DEFINITIONS
A. Common Features of Reincorporations
While the types of transactions described above vary in many par-
ticulars, they share in common the fact that the business or businesses
conducted by the distributing corporation are continued (a) in cor-
porate form (b) by corporations which are (c) controlled by the per-
sons who are the recipients of the liquidating distributions. In the
sense of the general definition given above,'" all transactions are "re-
organizations," but the statutory definitions do not speak in general
terms.' Courts are faced with a rule of strict interpretation demand-
ing literal compliance with the reorganization sections as a condition
to application of the "non-recognition" provisions of Subchapter C.17
Few, if any, of the transactions described above comply with the literal
definitions of reorganizations as defined in section 368.18
B. Reincorporations as Reorganizations
Of the six types of reorganizations defined in section 368(a)(1),
mergers and consolidations (type A), stock acquisitions (type B), and
practical mergers resulting from asset acquisitions (type C) are or-
' See note 3 supra.In the reincorporation area the specificity of the taxing statutes is what creates
the most difficult problems. Concerning the extreme detail of the Code, Randolph Paul
has stated that "Perhaps this is the underlying problem of taxation today. We have
an alarming multiplication of meticulous detail in overloaded statutes and regula-
tions. This sort of particularization precludes extension of meaning." PAUL,
STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 164 (3d ser. 1940). The specificity of the Code has
been defended because of the necessity of predictability in tax matters and for other
reasons. See statement by Norris Darrell in Hearings Before the House Committee
on Ways and Means on Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapters C, J and
K of the Internal Revenue Code, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
17 "In order to exclude transactions not intended to be included, the specifications
of the reorganization provisions of the law are precise. Both the terms of the speci-
fications and their underlying assumptions and purposes must be satisfied in order to
entitle the taxpayer to the benefit of the exception from the general rule [of recogni-
tion of realized gain]." Treas. Reg. §1.368-1(b)(1955). See also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.368-2(a) (1955).
" See Grubb, Corporate Manipulations Under Subchapter C: Reincorporation-
Liquidation, 28 U. CiNc. L. REv. 304, 319-23 (1959).
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dinarily of little relevance in reincorporation transactions. Where
reincorporations are classified as reorganizations, they will ordinarily
be designated as type D reorganizations (which includes divisive re-
organizations, simple reincorporations and some practical mergers),
type E (recapitalizations) or type F (a "mere change in identity,
form, or place of organization, however effected"). Until Davant,
all reincorporations not qualifying under section 331 were held to be
type D reorganizations. 9
The first requirement of a type D reorganization is: a transfer by
one corporation of some or all of its assets to a second corporation (or
corporations) if immediately after the transfer the first corporation,
its shareholders, or both combined, own eighty per cent or more of
the stock of the second corporation (or corporations).2° A liquidation-
reincorporation might not appear to meet this requirement because
the first corporation does not transfer assets to the second corporation.
First the assets are distributed to the shareholders. The subsequent
transfer of assets to the new corporation is made by the shareholders of
the old corporation rather than the corporation itself. However, by
applying the "step-transaction" doctrine,2 or by treating the share-
holders as mere conduits, courts can and do find a transfer from the
first to the second corporation. 2 A sale-liquidation could also be a
""At this stage.., only the D-reorganization is likely to be applicable." Brom-
berg, Pitfalls in Corporate Liquidation, 44 TAXES 174, 185 (1966).
'I NT. RE v. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (D). The "control" requirement must be
met literally. Hyman H. Berghash, 43 T.C. 743 (1965), aff'd 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.
1966) ; Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962).
See Paul & Zimet, Step Transactions, in PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL
TAXATION 200, 228-29 (2d Ser. 1938); Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate
Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. TAX INsT. 247 (1954).
' The requirement of a transfer from one corporation to another is met even
though the property passes between the corporations through a conduit, if the steps
are part of a single scheme or plan of reorganization. See Helvering v. Alabama
Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 (1942) (bankruptcy reorganization). Not all
circuits held that "liquidation-reincorporation" transactions amounted to reorgani-
zations. In Henricksen v. Braicks, 137 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1943), the old corporation
was liquidated and its assets were transferred to a new corporation on the same day.
The court held there was no reorganization because the shareholders immediately
after the liquidation were under no obligation to transfer assets to the new corpora-
tion. See also United States v. Arcade Co., 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 828 (1953). On the other hand, in Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753 (8th
Cir. 1947), and Bard-Parker Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 906 (1955), type D reorganizations were found in circumstances
similar to those in the Henricksen and Arcade cases. The former cases held expli-
citly that the transfer of assets to shareholders and transfer by the shareholders to the
new corporation should be disregarded, leaving a direct transfer by the old corpora-
tion to the new corporation. Although the two lines of cases may be distinguishable,
they are nevertheless inconsistent. The Henricksen and Braicks cases have never
been expressly overruled. The Tax Court has chosen to follow Bard-Parker and
Survaunt, however, and it is doubtful whether Henricksen and Arcade are valid even
in the circuits in which they were decided. In referring to Arcade, Professors Bitt-
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type D reorganization if the selling and purchasing corporation are
under common control, but qualification for reorganization treatment
at the shareholder level also requires that there be a distribution,
pursuant to the plan of reorganization, of stock or securities of the
corporation to which assets are transferred. In effect, there must be
an "exchange" of stock or securities of the old corporation for stock
or securities of the corporation acquiring the assets.2 3 In sale-liquida-
tion transactions there would ordinarily be no exchange because the
shareholders of the selling corporation receive no new stock or securi-
ties in the buying corporation upon the liquidation of the selling cor-
poration. If, however, (a) the shareholders of the first corporation
formed the second corporation by paying cash for stock, (b) the cash
was used to buy the operating assets of the first corporation, and (c)
the first corporation then distributed its retained liquid assets and the
cash received from the second corporation to shareholders of the first
corporation, courts found an "exchange" by disregarding the original
contribution of cash by shareholders to the new corporation. The
cash transactions had no substance because the money merely made a
circular flow from shareholders of the old corporation through the new
corporation to the old corporation and back to the original share-
holders. If the money transfers were disregarded "the effect of all
steps taken" was a surrender of shares of the old corporation and a
receipt of shares of the new corporation-an exchange in substance if
not in form.24 The same result would not necessarily follow, of course,
if the buying corporation had been in existence for several years prior
to the transaction and used its own earnings to purchase assets of the
selling corporation.2 5
The second requirement of a type D reorganization is that stock or
securities of the corporation to which assets are transferred be dis-
tributed in a transaction qualifying under section 354, 355 or 356.20
ker and Eustice have stated that "although it may be too early for the last rites, the
case does not inspire one with confidence." BITTKER & EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 571 (2d ed. 1966).
See note 26 infra.
' Walter S. Heller, 2 T.C. 371 (1943), aff'd, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1945). In
Liddon v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1956), shareholders of the old corpor-
ation paid $25,000 to the new corporation in exchange for virtually all its stock. Old
corporation then sold its assets to new corporation and liquidated. It was held that
in net effect there was an exchange of stock for stock.
Cf. Trianon Hotel Co., 30 T.C. 156 (1958).
Qualification under § 354 requires that there be an "exchange" of stock or secur-
ities of one corporate party to a reorganization for stock or securities of another
corporate party to a reorganization "pursuant to a plan of reorganization." Similar
requirements existed under the 1939 Code. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 112(b) (3).
The existence of a "plan of reorganization" is easily inferred in reincorporation
[ VOL. 42 :737
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The effect of these provisions is that qualification as a type D reor-
ganization requires either:
(1) That the transferor corporation transfer to the transferee cor-
poration "substantially all" of its assets. Stock or securities re-
ceived by the transferor from the transferee and any other assets of
the transferor must then be distributed to the transferor's share-
holders "in pursuance of the plan of reorganization"; 27 or
(2) That the transferor corporation transfer to each transferee cor-
poration a separate active business conducted for at least five years
prior to the distribution. After the transfer of a separate business
(or separate businesses) to the transferee corporation (or corpora-
tions) the transferor corporation must either (a) have no assets
other than stock or securities of the transferee corporation(s), or
(b) carry on a separate business conducted for at least five years.2
These additional requirements are apparently designed to prevent a
transfer of investment assets to a controlled subsidiary which is fol-
cases. In John G. Moffatt, 42 T.C. 558 (1964), aff'd, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), it
was held that the existence of a list of recommendations prepared by an accountant
for the liquidating corporation, together with the adoption of one of those recommenda-
tions (a liquidation and reincorporation) in a slightly modified form, was sufficient to
show the existence of a plan of reorganization. The implication in United States v.
Arcade Co., 203 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir. 1953) that existence of a plan of reorganization
requires a written plan formally adopted by all corporate parties to the reorganization
can no longer be considered valid. Under present case law, a plan appears to exist if
there is an intention at the time of liquidation of the old corporation that the business
of the old corporation shall be carried on in corporate form after the liquidation by
substantially the same shareholdes. See Charles R. Mathis, Jr., 19 T.C. 1123 (1953),
where absence of an intention to reincorporate at the time of liquidation precluded the
existence of a plan of reorganization despite a reincorporation nine months later. No
cases under the 1954 Code involving liquidations and reincorporations have been found
in which a liquidating distribution otherwise subject to taxation under the reorganiza-
tion provisions has been taxed under § 331 because of the absence of a "plan of reor-
ganization." Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965) acq., 1966
INT. REv. BULL. No. 16, at 5, does imply, however, that if the shareholders of a liquidat-
ing corporation do not intend to carry on the same business in corporate form, there can
be no reorganization. See also Ketler v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1952).
But cf. Morley Cypress Trust, Schedule "B", 3 T.C. 84 (1944).
-
TI=T. REi. CODE OF 1954, § 354(b) (1).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 355. An excellent discussion of the background and
development of § 355 may be found in Jacobs, Spin-Offs: The Pre-Distribution Two
Business Rule-Edmund P. Coady and Beyond, 19 TAx L. Rv. 155 (1964). Section
355 requires not only that the business have been conducted for five years; it also
requires that the business not have been acquired by the corporation within that time
in a transaction in which gain or loss is recognized in whole or in part. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 355(b) (2) (C). It is hard to see how a liquidation and reincorporation
transaction could ever meet the requirements of §355. Section 355(b)(1) requires
either that immediately after the distribution the distributing corporation be en-
gaged in a business or, if the distributing business is not engaged in a business after
the distribution, it must immediately before the distribution have "no assets other
than stock or securities in the controlled corporations .... " If the purpose of a liqui-
dation is to take out assets not needed in the business, the distributing corporation
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lowed by a tax free spin-off of shares of the subsidiary. The require-
ments raise several questions: Can a corporation with substantial
liquid assets transfer its operating assets to a new subsidiary for
stock, then liquidate, and successfully claim there was no reorganiza-
tion because retention of substantial liquid assets meant there was no
transfer of "substantially all" assets? Can a corporation sell its op-
erating assets to a sister corporation for cash, then liquidate, and
successfully claim there was no reorganization because there was no
"distribution of stock or securities" of the transferee corporation?
Can a corporation conducting two businesses, one conducted for less
than five years, avoid reorganization treatment by transferring the
two businesses to separate corporations for stock, and then liquidate?
And if the businesses were conducted for more than five years, could
the old corporation transfer each business to a separate subsidiary for
stock, retain all liquid assets, then liquidate and claim there was no
reorganization because the old corporation retained property other
than securities of controlled corporations?
If the transaction escapes classification as a type D reorganization,
can the Commissioner show that it was nevertheless a type E (recap-
italization), type F (mere change in identity, place of organization,
etc.), or a combination of the two? And, even if the transaction can
be classified as a reorganization, do the "dividend within gain" lim-
itations of section 356 apply or can the distribution of boot be taxed
as a normal dividend by a going corporation under section 301?
Finally, if the transaction cannot be classified as a reorganization, can
the Commissioner nevertheless show it is not a liquidation in sub-
stance, and tax the distribution as a normal dividend?
Most of these difficulties arise out of logical difficulties inherent in
Subchapter C. The policy of granting capital gains treatment to
will of necessity have assets other than stock or securities of subsidiaries. If, for
example, a corporation conducts two separate active businesses, transfers each busi-
ness to a separate subsidiary for stock, retains its liquid assets and cash, and liqui-
dates, the requirements of § 355 will not be met because the liquidating corporation
had assets other than stock or securities of subsidiaries prior to the liquidation.
Even if this condition did not exist, § 355 cannot apply where the transaction is used
"principally as a device for the distribution of earnings and profits .... " The irony
is that a tax avoidance motive could lead to disqualification of a liquidation and
reincorporation as a type D reorganization.
Neither § 354 nor § 355 could apply to typical liquidations and reincorporations,
because they apply only when property other than stock or securities are not received
by the shareholder. But § 356 applies where § 354 or § 355 would apply except for the
fact that property other than stock or securities is received by the shareholder. INT.
REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 356(a). This means that a distribution qualifying under § 356
must also meet the requirements of § 354 or § 355 except their requirements that the
recipient receive only non-recognition property.
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liquidating distributions is questionable. 9 Where section 331 does not
apply, the creation of two differing sets of rules for cash distributions,
depending on whether the distribution is or is not pursuant to a plan
of reorganization, is even more questionable." And attempting to use
the reorganization provisions, which were designed primarily as relief
measures to prevent taxation in certain corporate adjustments, to cope
with reincorporations adds a final touch of absurdity. The tortuous
path courts must follow in utilizing the reorganization sections to pre-
vent abuse in reincorporation schemes is illustrated in the recent case
of Davant v. Commissioner.3
IV. THE Davant CASE
Davant involved four families who were the sole owners of two
corporations, South Texas Water Co. ("Water") and South Texas
Rice Warehouse Co. ("Warehouse"), utilized in raising, drying and
storing of rice. Both corporations had substantial earnings and profits.
Warehouse apparently had over $200,000 in cash, and operating assets
worth at least $700,000. Water had liquid assets of at least $700,00032
in addition to its operating assets. The shareholders of Water (who
were also the shareholders of Warehouse) sold their Warehouse stock
to a third party for about $915,000. (The purchaser obtained the
funds by means of a short-term bank loan.) Warehouse then adopted
a plan of complete liquidation to be effected within one year and
promptly sold its operating assets to Water for $700,000. It then dis-
tributed the $700,000 received from Water plus about $230,000 in
cash to the new sole shareholder in complete liquidation. The new
shareholder then paid the bank loan and was left with a profit of about
$15,000.1' The operating assets of Warehouse continued to be owned
' Bittker & Redlich, Corporate Liquidations And The Income Tax, 5 TAx L.
REv. 437, 449 (1950).
" See Shoulson, Boot Taxation: The Blunt Toe of the Automatic Rule, 20 TAX L.
REv. 573, 579 (1965).
31366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), petition for cert. filed, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3227 (U.S.
Dec. 27, 1966) (No. 911). The case was tried in the Tax Court sub nora. South Texas
Rice Warehouse Co., 43 T.C. 540 (1965). The appeal from the Tax Court decision
gave rise to two decisions at the circuit court, viz., Davant, supra, and South Texas
Rice Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1966), petition for cert.
filed, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3227 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1966) (No. 910). In Davant the Tax Court
opinion was affirmed in part and reversed in part. In the companion case the Tax
Court decision was affirmed. Since the companion case to Davant involved a reallo-
cation of income between a lessor corporation and a lessee partnership, it will not be
discussed in this article.
2 Of this $700,000, about $500,000 appears to have been the proceeds of a loan ob-
tained shortly before, and in anticipation of, the transaction. South Texas Rice
Warehouse Co., 43 T.C. 540, 553 (1965).
cIbid.
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by Water-a corporation with "identical shareholders and identical
distribution of shares" 4 to Warehouse.
In viewing the transaction as a whole, the court found that the
"purchaser" had acted as a mere conduit and that the sale should be
disregarded. What occurred in fact was a sale of assets by one cor-
poration (Warehouse) to another (Water) followed by a distribution
by the selling corporation to persons who were also the sole share-
holders of the buyer. The remaining question was whether the amounts
treated as being distributed directly to the shareholders of Warehouse
and Water should be treated as a dividend distribution under section
301, a distribution in complete liquidation qualifying for capital gains
treatment under section 331, or a distribution pursuant to a reorgani-
zation taxable under section 356. The court found that the transaction
constituted a type D and type F reorganization. It then held that the
distribution was taxable under section 301 because the distribution
was "functionally unrelated" to the reorganization 5 and therefore not
subject to the restrictions of section 356. Alternatively, it held that
the distribution was "boot" distributed pursuant to a plan of reorga-
nization, and that gain recognized on the transaction should be taxed
under sections 354 and 356 as a dividend to the extent of earnings
and profits. The court's final holding was that "earnings and profits"
in this case should include the earnings and profits of the buying cor-
poration (Water) as well as the selling or distributing corporation
(Warehouse). Because the same shareholders controlled both corpora-
tions, the court concluded that even if only earnings and profits of
the distributing corporation could normally be considered, the Com-
missioner could properly attribute earnings and profits of the buying
corporation to the distributing corporation under section 482 "in order
to prevent evasion of taxes.
3 6
"' 366 F.2d at 883.
Id. at 888.
This aspect of the case is without precedent and probably is erroneous.
Section 45 [the predecessor of § 482] authorizes the distribution, apportionment,
or allocation of gross income, deductions, credits or allowances; it does not author-
ize the distribution, apportionment, or allocation of net assets, surplus, or accumu-
lated earnings and profits either specifically or by necessary implication. The
purpose of §45 as set forth in Regulations 118, §39.45-1(b), is the placing of "a
controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer" within the
scope of a determination of "the true net income from the property and business
of a controlled taxpayer." Respondent's action herein neither accomplishes such a
purpose nor falls within such scope.
Walter S. Morgan, 33 T.C. 30, 41 (1959). The Commissioner acquiesced to this
rule. 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 6. The holding of another aspect of the Morgan case was
overruled in Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1961). See note 46 infra
and accompanying text. The Commissioner in effect decides what a corporation's
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V. CLASSIFICATION AS A REORGANIZATION
A. Type D Reorganization
That the "sale" of Warehouse stock to an outsider was disregarded
is not at all surprising.3I But even if the sale is disregarded, the literal
requirements of a type D reorganization were not met. Since Ware-
house did not retain a separate active business, classification as a type
D reorganization required that (a) "substantially all" assets of Ware-
house be transferred to Water and (b) "stock or securities" of Water
be distributed to the shareholders of Warehouse pursuant to the plan of
reorganization.
1. Transfer of "Substantially All" Assets. Of assets valued at about
$930,000, Warehouse transferred operating assets to Water for
$700,000, retaining about $230,000 in liquid assets. It has long been
settled that liquid assets retained by the transferor may be disregarded
in determining whether "substantially all" assets have been trans-
ferred.3 Indeed, if the requirement were construed literally to include
liquid as well as operating business assets in determining what con-
stitutes "substantially all" assets, very few liquidations and reincor-
porations could be type D reorganizations.3 9 A principal purpose of
many reincorporation transactions is to withdraw liquid assets from
the transferor corporation. The liquid assets are therefore not trans-
ferred, and if substantial in amount, the old corporation would not
transfer "substantially all" assets to the transferee corporation unless
the retained liquid assets are disregarded. The term "substantially all
gross income, deductions, credits and allowances are for a given year when he chooses
either to exercise or not to exercise the powers given to him in § 482. The Davant
ruling, by permitting the Commissioner to allocate earnings and profits, in effect
authorizes the Commissioner to determine that a corporation's yearly income is one
figure for the purpose of calculating annual tax, but another figure for the purpose of
calculating accumulated earnings and profits.
' Taxpayer may have relied on Sun Properties, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.2d
171 (5th Cir. 1955), where a transfer of property owned by a shareholder to his wholly-
owned corporation in return for an unsecured note was respected for tax purposes
although note payments came from lease rentals and the corporation had few other
assets. But the transfer in Davant was too artificial to be taken seriously. If a court
telescopes a transfer from an old corporation to its shareholders and a re-transfer by
the shareholders to a new corporation into one transfer directly from the old to the
new corporation in order to find a D reorganization (see text accompanying notes 21
& 22 supra), it can also telescope a transfer to a "purchaser" and payment by the "pur-
chaser" of liquidation proceeds to the shareholders through the loan device into a
direct transfer by the liquidating corporation to the original shareholders.
See, e.g., Ernest F. Becher, 22 T.C. 932 (1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955),
... the Commissioner may appropriately ignore the failure to transfer to the con-
tinuing corporation non-business assets which would have been available for the
payment of dividends." Whitaker, supra note 4, at 217.
See Kuhn, Liquidation and Reincorporation Under the 1954 Code, 51 GEo. L.J.
96, 105 (1962).
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assets" has therefore been held to mean substantially all assets needed
to conduct the business of the enterprise."
It has even been held that "substantially all" assets are transferred
when some assets necessary to conduct the business are retained by
the old corporation, distributed to its shareholders, and then leased to
the new corporation.4 In James Armour, Inc.,42 the old corporation
had assets worth about $1,230,000. Business assets worth about
$628,000 were transferred to the new corporation. Assets not trans-
ferred but necessary to the new corporation included real property
worth about $180,000. These assets were distributed to the share-
holders of the old corporation and leased to the new corporation. The
court nonetheless held that "substantially all" assets had been trans-
ferred. It was sufficient that the new corporation "either acquired title
to, or the use of," all the assets essential to the conduct of the business
enterprise.43 To hold otherwise would enable small, closely held cor-
porations owning real property used in the business to avoid a type D
reorganization simply by distributing substantial property to share-
holders of the old corporation for lease to the new corporation.
It is not yet clear to what extent distributions of property followed
by leasebacks to the new corporation will be regarded as direct trans-
fers to the new corporation. What is clear is that the term "substan-
tially all" means no more than "substantially all assets needed to
"Retail Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1463 (1964).
In John G. Moffatt, 42 T.C. 558 (1964), aff'd, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), DuiE
L.J. 1168 (1966), for example, over 35% of the old corporation's assets were retained
by it. These assets included land and building plans for facilities which might have
been used at some later date by the corporation but were not currently used and cer-
tainly not essential to the conduct of the business. In affirming the Tax Court's
ruling that substantially all assets were nevertheless transferred, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals indicated that where assets sufficient in the amount to enable the
new corporation to carry on the business of the old are transferred, the "substantially
all" requirement has been met. Judge Craig dissented, stating that "if Congress in-
tended to limit the transfer to 'operative assets' it would have said so. Congress did
not, and the Court should not read into the Code that which is not there." Id. at 270.
Cf. the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes in Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed. 30, 32(1st Cir. 1908). ("[It is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say we see
what you [the legislature] are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we
shall go on as before.").
In Retail Properties Inc., supra, 60% in value of the old corporation's assets con-
sisted of stock of the pre-existing transferee corporation. After the transfer was com-
pleted, the old corporation was liquidated and the transaction was held to constitute a
type D reorganization. It has been said that "the stated basis for this decision is
tantamount to substituting for the word 'assets' in § 354(b) (1) (A) the word 'business'
." Whitaker, supra note 4, at 218.
' James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964). See also Daniels Buick, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 251 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1958).
'243 T.C. 295 (1964).
Id. at 309 (emphasis supplied).
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carry on the business carried on by the old corporation."44 The Court
in Davant thus had no difficulty in deciding that Warehouse had trans-
ferred "substantially all" its assets to Water.
2. Distribution of Stock or Securities of Transferee Corporation.
The transaction in Davant did not conform literally to the require-
ment that stock or securities of the transferee corporation be distri-
buted to shareholders in exchange for their stock in the transferor.
Since Water paid cash for the assets of Warehouse, the shareholders
of Warehouse received cash-not additional stock of Water. This is
true in any sale-liquidation type of transaction where the selling cor-
poration does not receive stock or securities of the buyer.
Under the 1939 Code, the requirements of an exchange of stock or
securities of the liquidating corporation for stock or securities of the
acquiring corporation was deemed satisfied even without literal com-
pliance with the statute in two situations, and there is no difficulty in
applying the same judicial doctrines to the wording of the 1954 Code.
The first, noted above,4a involved the formation of a new corporation
for cash, use of that cash by the new corporation to purchase the op-
erating assets of the old and a subsequent liquidation of the old cor-
poration. In these circumstances payment of cash to the new corpora-
tion followed by a redistribution of the same cash to the shareholders
of the old could be disregarded as being without substance. Thus the
end result was a surrender of shares of the old in return for shares of
the new corporation. The second situation involved two pre-existing
active corporations, both owned by the same shareholders and in the
same proportions. The first corporation contributed its operating as-
sets to the second, receiving nothing in return, and then liquidated.
It was held that under these facts the shareholders of the liquidating
corporation were in exactly the same position they would have been in
if (a) the second corporation had issued stock for the assets of the
first, and (b) that stock had been distributed to the shareholders. 6
"See note 40 supra. A type C reorganization requires a transfer of "substantially
all of the properties" of the transferor in return for voting stock of the transferee.
Cases construing that phrase are probably applicable to the term substantially all
"assets" in a type D reorganization. ("We may assume that 'substantially all the
properties' used in one reorganization provision is to be given the same interpreta-
tion as 'substantially all of the assets' used in another such provision." Ralph C.
Wilson, Sr., 46 T.C. 334, 347 (1966)). The "substantially all" requirement in type C
reorganizations seems designed to ensure continuity of business enterprise. The
"substantially all" requirement in type D reorganizations has an additional purpose
-"to prevent abuses of the 'spin-off' technique." Whitaker, supra note 4, at 200.
"See note 24 supra.
"Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836(1961). Unlike the example in the text, Morgan involved a sole shareholder. Lane,
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In either case the shareholder would end up owning 100 per cent of
the stock of the second corporation and therefore was treated as if
he had received stock of the second corporation pursuant to the trans-
action.
There were no cases under the 1939 Code, however, where: (1) mul-
tiple shareholders owned stock in identical proportions in two pre-
existing active corporations, and (2) by using a substantial amount of
its own accumulated earnings one corporation purchased the operating
assets of the other. The problem was unresolved with the enactment of
the 1954 code. Some commentators thought that in these circumstances
it could not be said that the transaction involved a distribution of
stock or securities of the buying corporation. The problem was first
presented in lames Armour, Inc.,48 where stock of two corporations
("Company A" and "Company B") was owned solely by James Ar-
mour and his wife. Company A was in the business of leasing con-
struction equipment to Company B, which engaged in actual con-
struction operations. Both companies had substantial earnings and
profits. Company A adopted a plan of complete liquidation to be
effected within one year, sold a minor portion of its business assets to a
third party at a gain, sold its construction equipment to B for an ac-
count receivable at a gain, and distributed all its assets to its share-
holders in complete liquidation. Company A claimed that no gain
should be recognized by it on the sale of its assets because the i-
quidation qualified under sections 331 and 337. For the same reasons,
Mr. and Mrs. Armour reported the difference between their adjusted
bases in their shares and the value of the purported liquidation distri-
bution as a long-term capital gain. The taxpayers claimed this could
supra note 4, at 1233, suggests that "the Morgan case goes too far in so drastically
altering the concept of an exchange...."
" "If a purchase from a liquidating corporation were made by a going corporation
with its own funds, the fact that the purchaser was controlled by stockholders of the
seller would not seem sufficient to warrant the disregard of the cash transaction and
treatment of the transfer of assets as made in exchange for stock." MacLean, Prob-
lems of Reincorporation and Related Proposals of the Subchapter C Advisory Group,
13 TAx L. REv. 407, 412 (1958).
An analogous problem was considered in Trianon Hotel Co., 30 T.C. 156 (1958).
One group of shareholders owned 83% of the stock of Corporation A and 79% of the
stock of Corporation T. Corporation A purchased all the stock of Corporation T and
one issue was whether the purchase of stock from shareholders of Corporation T who
were also shareholders of Corporation A was a disguised dividend (or redemption) by
Corporation A, or a true purchase and sale. The transaction was held to constitute a
true sale. (The result would be changed under present law by INT. IREV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 304, which would treat the transaction as a redemption by A of its own stock.) See
also Commissioner v. Pope, 239 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1957); Emma Cramer, 20 T.C. 679
(1953).
,43 T.C. 295 (1964).
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not be a type D reorganization because there was no distribution of
stock or securities of the transferee corporation. Since Mr. and Mrs.
Armour already owned all the stock of Company B, however the court
found that "the issuance of further stock would have been a meaning-
less gesture," and the court could not "conclude that the statute re-
quires such a vain act."49
Although the court in Davant adopted the reasoning of the Tax
Court in Armour and similar cases,50 the Tax Court's reliance on a
previous case5' involving a contribution of assets by the liquidating to
the surviving corporation seems misplaced. Where one corporation
contributes assets to a second corporation owned by the same share-
holders in the same proportions, the transaction is functionally the
same as if assets had been transferred for stock. But a transfer for
cash or short-term notes is not. The difference may be illustrated by
an example:
"Id. at 307. Trianon Hotel Co. supra note 47 may be distinguished from Armour
because there was not "complete identity" of shareholders of the t-wo corporations in-
volved in Trianon.
' Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Ralph C. Wilson, Sr.,
46 T.C. 334 (1966). In Wilson, a second issue was whether gain realized by the corpor-
ation on sales of property to third parties, made after the adoption of a plan of com-
plete liquidation to be effected within 12 months, should be recognized to the corpor-
ation. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 337(a) provides for non-recognition of gain at the
corporate level in such circumstances.
The court held that under the circumstances "section 337(a), like section 331, is
inapplicable, since there was no 'complete liquidation'...." 46 T.C. at 352. See also
Retail Properties, Inc., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1463 (1964), where § 337 was held in-
applicable because the liquidation was pursuant to a reorganization. In Bromberg,
Pitfalls in Corporate Liquidation, 44 TAXES 174, 182, the author states that "since
reincorporation negates complete liquidation, section 337 is unavailable, and gain on
any sale between corporations loses its exemption." But cf. Rice, When Is a Liquida-
tion Not a Liquidation for Federal Income Tax Purposes? 8 STAN. L. REv. 208, 216(1958).
Decisions taxing liquidations and reincorporations under the reorganization
sections are not, however, based on the lack of a "complete liquidation," but rather on
the assumption that "the liquidation of a corporation may be merely a step in a
reorganization." James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295, 305. See also Liddon v. Commis-
sioner, 230 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956); Survaunt v. Com-
missioner, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947); Love v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 236 (3d Cir.
1940). If a liquidation is a step in a reorganization, distributions to shareholders
are governed by § 356 rather than § 331. Gain on sales to other corporate parties to the
reorganization would be exempted under § 361. But the reorganization sections
contain no provisions governing sales to third parties by corporate parties to a
reorganization and could therefore not supersede § 337. Accordingly, if there is a
liquidation in fact, § 337 should, at least prima facie, apply to sales by liquidating
corporations to outside parties, even if the liquidation is pursuant to a reorgani-
zation.
The logic of Wilson and Retail Properties, Inc. is debatable. It is not even clear
whether, as a matter of policy, sales pursuant to liquidations effected in the course of
a reorganization should not be eligible for the benefits of § 337. Taxation at the
corporate level could be avoided in any event by a distribution in kind rather than
by a direct sale by the corporation and to the extent §§ 1245 & 1250 apply they apply
whether or not the sale qualifies under § 337.
' Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836
(1961).
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Corporation A has $500 cash and business assets worth $500. Corpora-
tion B also has $500 cash and business assets worth $500. The earnings
and profits of each corporation amount to $500. Taxpayer owns all stock
of each corporation, having an adjusted basis of $100 in the stock of A
and $100 in the stock of B.
If one assumes that A transfers its business assets to B for no con-
sideration, and distributes its cash of $500 to taxpayer in complete
liquidation, it is clear that the taxpayer is in exactly the same position
as if stock of B had been issued to A and then distributed to taxpayer.
In either event he receives $500 in cash, and in either event he is the
sole shareholder of B. To say there has been no reorganization because
there was no distribution of securities would be unrealistic. If a tax-
payer owns 100 per cent of a corporation's stock, the number of shares
into which that stock is broken down is irrelevant for tax purposes 2
If, on the other hand, Corporation B had paid $500 in cash for A's
business assets, the transactions are not functionally the same as if B
had issued stock instead of cash. First, the entire gain of $900 is
recognized.53 Second, the cash purchase enables the two corporations
to distribute $1000 of earnings and profits instead of only $500.
Finally, the shareholder's basis in the B stock remains unchanged.
Although in cases of contribution of assets it can be stated that there
is, in effect, a transfer of stock or securities, and thus literal com-
pliance with the requirements of a type D reorganization; in cases of
cash purchases, it is not possible to state that, in effect, there is a trans-
fer of stock or securities if the cash received constituted full payment
for the assets sold. 54 Consequently, it seems logically difficult to find a
D reorganization when there has been a cash purchase of assets.
However, even in a cash purchase situation, the Tax Court in-
explicably found a D reorganization, reasoning that a distribution of
" Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
But it would still be necessary to treat the taxpayer as if he had received B stock.
Thus, the "amount realized" would be $1000, consisting of $500 cash, plus stock pre-
sumably worth $500. Realized gain would be $900, not $400. Only $500 would be
recognized, and taxpayer's basis in Corporation B would be increased by $100. Com-
missioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836 (1961), does
not spell this out, and the case has been criticized in part because it "does not explain
how the shareholder's basis in the seller's stock can be added to his basis in the
purchaser's stock." Lane, The Reincorporation Game: Have the Ground Rules Really
Changed? 77 HAav. L. REV. 1218, 1233 (1964).
. To treat the shareholder as if he had received stock from the second corporation
would be completely unrealistic, for it would mean that the amount realized (in the
example given) would be $1500, when total assets of the old corporation were worth
only $1000.
" See notes 52 & 53 supra.
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stock or securities of the purchasing corporation was unnecessary.
The Tax Court failed to distinguish a contribution from a saleY
Nevertheless, tax avoidance possibilities remained. In the example
given above, B's purchase of A's business assets for $500 followed by
a liquidation of A enabled the shareholder to withdraw the earnings of
B at capital gains rates, because the Tax Court could have held, in
accordance with the general assumption,5 that the amount taxed as
ordinary income under section 356 could not exceed the earnings and
profits of the distributing corporation.57 Only $500 of the $900 gain
would have been taxed as ordinary income. The court in Davant
resolved the logical difficulty and closed the loophole by finding that
the "purchase price" was a direct distribution to shareholders of the
buyer. Even though the Court did not expressly so hold, the so-called
seller could then be treated in the same manner as if it had contributed
rather than sold its assets to the so-called buyer. As noted above, a
receipt of stock or securities of the transferee corporation would not be
required where the transferor's assets are contributed, rather than sold,
to the transferee because the transaction is functionally the same as if
stock or securities of the transferee had been received and distrib-
uted. 8
In Davant, the earnings and profits of the distributing corporation
(Warehouse) amounted to less than $200,000, while those of the pur-
chasing corporation (Water) amounted to nearly $700,000. Under the
rules of the Tax Court, recognized gain taxed as ordinary income could
not exceed the earnings and profits of Warehouse. 59 The Fifth Circuit
'James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964); South Texas Rice Warehouse Co., 43
T.C. 540 (1965), on this point aff'd sub nom. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874(5th Cir. 1966) ; Ralph C. Wilson, Sr., 46 T.C. 334 (1966).
" See SuRREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INcozIE TAXATIo 1613 (1960 ed.).
'James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295, 312-13 (1964). In Armour, total realized and
recognized gain was about $1,100,000, while earnings and profits of Armour amounted
to only about $64,000, so that under the rule of § 356 (a) (2) about $560,000 would be
treated as a capital gain unless it could be said to be a disguised dividend, from the
purchaser. The Commissioner claimed that because purchaser's basis in the acquired
assets would be the same as seller's, all excess of that amount should be treated as a
disguised dividend from the purchaser. Assume, for example, that a corporation has
assets with a basis of $100 and a value of $500 which it sells to a second corporation
in a transaction designated as a reorganization under the rule of the Armour case.
Under § 362(b) the buyer's basis is not its cost ($500), but is the basis of the seller($100). The Commissioner claimed that the difference ($400) should be treated as a
disguised dividend from the purchaser since for tax purposes it is treated as if it
paid only $100. The Tax Court discarded this contention in Armour (43 T.C. 540,571-72) and in its disposition of the Davant case. See also James Wilson, Sr., 46
T.C. 334 (1966).
' See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
r "...[F]ollowing our decision in James Armour, Inc. [43 T.C. 295 (1964)], we hold
that the amount of the distribution by Warehouse . . . to petitioners was a dividend
only to the extent of earnings and profits of Warehouse and the balance is to be
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Court of Appeals held, however, that "where there is complete iden-
tity"6 of stockholders, both corporations should be treated as the dis-
tributing corporation. Although the opinion is not entirely clear, the
court appears to have found that there was in substance no "sale" of
assets by Water to Warehouse. Warehouse had merely served as a
conduit through which Water made a normal distribution of $700,000
to its shareholders. Concurrently, Warehouse contributed its assets to
Water and then distributed its remaining liquid assets to its share-
holders.
Davant involved two corporations owned by identical shareholders
in identical proportions. The operating assets of the two corporations
were merged and liquid assets needed in neither business were distrib-
uted. Despite formal trappings, the transaction was in substance a
practical merger of operating assets with a concurrent distribution of
liquid assets.
B. Classifying a Transaction as a Type F Reorganization1
The transactions in Davant were held to constitute a type F reor-
ganization-"a mere change in identity, form or place of organiza-
tion . ,." Since the transactions were also held to constitute a type
D reorganization this additional holding was unnecessary to the result.
The holding also seems erroneous, because a practical merger of two
pre-existing businesses is more than a mere change in identity, form or
place of organization of either one. The regulations under section
381(b) (relating to the carryover of certain corporate attributes)
indicate that a type F reorganization does not include a practical
merger: 63
[The] acquiring corporation [in a type F reorganization] shall be treated
... just as the transferor corporation would have been treated if there
treated as capital gains to the extent that it exceeds the basis of petitioners in their
stock." South Texas Rice Warehouse Co., 43 T.C. 540, 570 (1965).
366 F.2d 874, 889.
The Commissioner has never been successful in gaining judicial acceptance in
classifying a reincorporation as a type E reorganization. A type E reorganization
is a reshuffling of the capital structure, within the framework of an existing corpora-
tion. Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942). A reincorporation
necessarily involves the transfer of assets from one corporation to another.
I INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 36 8 (a) (1) (F). Prior to Davant a type F reorganiza-
tion had typically "been understood to comprehend only such insignificant modifications
as the reincorporation of the same corporate business with the same assets and the
same stockholders surviving under a new charter either in the same or in a different
State, the renewal of a corporate charter having a limited life, or the conversion of
a U.S.-chartered savings and loan association to a State-chartered institution."
Hyman H. Berghash, 43 T.C. 743, 752 (1965), aff'd 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966). See
also Ahles Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1934).
Treas. Reg. § 1.381(b)-1 (a) (2) (1960).
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had been no reorganization. Thus, the taxable year of the transferor cor-
poration shall not end on the date of transfer merely because of the
transfer.
This regulation seems to contemplate a circumstance where the new
corporation is merely the alter ego of the old; it could hardly apply
where two pre-existing businesses with different taxable years are
merged.
The Court's willingness to find an F reorganization in Davant does,
however, raise the question of whether a transaction which avoids
classification as a D reorganization may be classified as an F reor-
ganization. 4 There can be no D reorganization where the transferee
corporation is not controlled by shareholders of the transferor and
where either (a) less than "substantially all" assets of the liquidating
corporation are transferred to the transferee; or (b) where, in division-
liquidations the detailed requirements of section 355 are not met. As
is indicated below, lack of control and failure to transfer substantially
all assets to the transferee is as much an obstacle to an F as to a D
reorganization, but designation of reincorporations as type F reor-
ganizations may be significant in division-liquidations not meeting the
requirements of section 355.
1. Lack of Control. Where a transaction cannot be designated a
type D reorganization because shareholders of the liquidating corpora-
tion do not control the transferee corporation, the same lack of control
would appear to prevent designating the transaction as a type F reor-
ganization. The Tax Court ruling in Joseph C. Gallagher that there
can be no type F reorganization where the transaction causes a signifi-
cant shift in proprietary interest recently has been affirmed in Hyman
H. Berghask where the shareholders of the liquidating corporation
acquired only fifty per cent of the transferee corporation's outstanding
stock. The transaction was not a D reorganization because share-
" See Morrison, The Line Between Liquidations and Reorganizations, 41 TAXES
785, 794 (1963).
'Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962). The case is intensively examined in
Lane, The Reincorporation Game: Have the Ground Rules Really Changed? 77 HARV.
L. REv. 1218 (1964). In Gallagher, five persons who owned 62% of the stock of a
liquidating Delaware corporation ("Delaware") purchased about 73% of the stock of
a California corporation ("California") for $218,000 cash. The remaining 27% of the
California stock was purchased by non-shareholding employees of Delaware for
$82,000. California then purchased Delaware's operating assets for about $100,000.
This left Delaware with over $1,000,000 of liquid assets which it distributed to its
shareholders in complete liquidation. The transaction could not qualify as a type D
reorganization because neither Delaware nor its shareholders, nor both combined,
"controlled" California within the meaning of § 368(c).
C 43 T.C. 743 (1965), aff'd 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966).
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holders of the liquidating corporation did not control the transferee
corporation, and it was precisely this "change in stock ownership" or
"shift in proprietary interest"" that prevented the Tax Court from des-
ignating the transaction a type F reorganization. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals stated subsequently that it was "in complete agree-
ment with the Tax Court's resolution of this issue."" Any time a trans-
action fails as a D reorganization because shareholders of the liquida-
ting corporation lose control of a transferee corporation there will
necessarily be the "change in stock ownership" which prevents desig-
nating the transaction an F reorganization.
2. Transfer of Less Than "Substantially All" Assets. A transfer of
less than "substantially all" assets is as much as obstacle to finding a
type F as a type D reorganization. In Pridemark, Inc.,69 the old cor-
poration terminated its business as a distributor of homes, sold a sub-
stantial amount of its assets to the manufacturer of the homes, and
distributed all its assets to one shareholder as trustee for himself and
the remaining shareholders. The trustee then transferred the remain-
ing operating assets to a new corporation for stock, distributed the ac-
quired stock but retained liquid assets for the beneficiaries.
Even though there was no shift in proprietary ownership as in
Gallagher and Berghash, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals never-
theless reversed the Tax Court's finding of a type F reorganization.
The Fourth Circuit ruled that there could be no type F reorganiza-
tion where there was no "continuity of business enterprise," finding
the new corporation did not conduct the same business as the old
corporation.7" The "continuity of business enterprise" test would seem
to be almost identical to the requirement in a type D reorganization
that "substantially all" assets be transferred to the new corporation,
especially since the term "substantially all" assets has been defined to
mean enough assets to enable the new corporation to carry on the
6143 T.C. at 752.
Commissioner v. Berghash, 361 F.2d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 1966).
'42 T.C. 510 (1964), rev'd 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), acq., 1966 INT. REv. BULL.
No. 16, at 5.
345 F.2d 35 (1965). The business conducted by the old corporation was continued
by the manufacturer for whom the old corporation acted as distributor. The court
stated that "the new corporation cannot fairly be considered a continuation of the old
business when in fact it has been continued, without interruption [by an unrelated
corporation]." Id. at 42. Compare, however, Ernest F. Becher, 22 T.C. 932 (1954),
aff'd, 221 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955), where a type D reorganization was found even
though the business carried on by the new corporation was completely different from
that carried on by the old. The Tax Court stated that "'reorganization presupposes
continuance of business under modified corporate forms' . . . , but does not require that
the business conducted be the same." 22 T.C. at 941.
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same business conducted by the liquidating corporation. As a practical
matter, a transaction failing to qualify as a type D reorganization
because insufficient assets have been transferred to enable the new
corporation to conduct the same business as the old will also fail to
qualify as a type F reorganization because of lack of "continuity of
business enterprise." Correspondingly, where there is "continuity of
business enterprise," the new corporation will have acquired "sub-
stantially all" assets of the liquidating corporation. 71
3. Failure to Meet Requirements of Section 355. Even with the
term "substantially all assets" interpreted as liberally as it now is, it is
most unlikely that the requirement that substantially all assets be
transferred to a single transferee corporation will be satisfied where
separate businesses are transferred from one liquidating corporation to
two or more separate transferee corporations.72 In such cases, the
transaction cannot be a type D reorganization unless after the transfer
of assets to the new corporation[s], the transferor either (a) has no
assets other than stock or securities of the transferee corporations or
(b) continues to conduct a separate business carried on for at least the
preceding five years. 3
The possibilities of designing division-liquidations in such a way
that they do not meet the conditions described above are many and
obvious. It is even probable that the typical division-liquidation
reincorporation avoids the conditions of section 355 precisely because
of the tax avoidance motives involved, i.e., the retention of liquid assets
by the transferor corporation and subsequent distribution of those
assets in complete liquidation. Where liquid assets (other than stock
or securities of the transferee corporation) are retained for subsequent
distribution, the liquidating corporation will necessarily have, imme-
diately after the transfer, the type of property that prevents the
transaction from meeting the conditions of section 355.74 Unless trans-
'Whitaker, Liquidation and Reincorporation, U. So. CAL. 1966 TAx INST. 191,
218. ("If the same business is carried on ... it seems that the Tax Court may find a
D reorganization.") See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
" "Exchanges in reorganizations under § 368(a) (1) (D) are included only when the
transferor corporation transfers substantially all its assets to a single transferee cor-
poration." S. Rm,. No. 1622 to accompany H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 265 (1954)
(emphasis supplied).
"One obvious device that taxpayers desiring to obtain capital gains treatment of
earnings withdrawals may attempt is to transfer operating assets to two or more cor-
porations and then liquidate the transferor." Lane, The Reincorporation Game: Have
the Ground Rules Really Changed? 77 HAxv. L. REv. 1218, 1256 (1964).
' See note 28 supra.
" It is unlikely that investment assets retained by a corporation ill be disre-
garded in determining whether a transaction qualifies under § 355. If a corporation
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actions of this type can be classified as type F reorganizations, tax-
payers may be able to avoid the reorganization provisions simply by
transferring assets to two transferee corporations rather than one.
Where the transferee corporations are newly formed to acquire sep-
arate businesses of the transferor, and where there is no shift in stock
ownership, it should be possible to classify the transaction as a type
F reorganization even if the requirements of section 355 are avoided.
At the same time, however, it would seem very difficult to categorize
as a type F reorganization a transaction where one corporation trans-
fers two separate businesses to two going corporations with pre-existing
tax attributes.7" Although the court in Davant held that a transfer of
properties to a going corporation with pre-existing tax attributes is not
incompatible with a type F reorganization, its holding is (as noted
above) inconsistent with Code section 381(b) and is even inconsistent
with the same court's statements in Reef Corp. v. Commissioner.7
It would also seem difficult to find a type F reorganization where
ownership of shares in each successor corporation is not identical to
ownership of shares in the liquidating corporation, unless the variance
is de minimis. But the kind of ingenuity courts may be expected to
exercise in finding no change in stock ownership is illustrated in Reef
where stock of the transferor corporation was controlled by two sep-
arate groups. The first group formed a new corporation which pur-
chased the assets of the old corporation for notes. The old corporation
then distributed in liquidation all its cash and some of the notes re-
ceived from the second corporation to the second group, and dis-
tributed only notes received from the second corporation to the first
group. The transaction was held to be a type F reorganization even
though the relative holdings of the two groups in the new corporation
appeared to be materially different from their relative holdings in the
old corporation. Share holdings were held to be identical by finding
that in a transaction unrelated to the reorganization the old corpora-
transfers its investment assets to a new subsidiary for stock and spins off the stock of
the subsidiary, the transaction does not qualify under § 355 because the holding of the
investments does not constitute a "separate business." Therefore the distribution of
the subsidiary stock would be taxed as a § 301 distribution. Rev. Rul. 66-204, 1966
INT. REv. BuLL. No. 29, at 14. If the same corporation retains its investment assets
and transfers its operating assets to a new corporation or to two new corporations
for stock and distributes the stock in redemption of the stock of some of its own
shareholders, the effect is the same. The purpose of the separate business requirement
is to prevent nonrecognition of gain on the distribution of subsidiary stock followed
by a sale of stock (of a corporation holding only investment assets) as a capital asset.
See Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
See Book Prod. Indus., Inc., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 339 (1965).
368 F.2d 125, 136 (5th Cir. 1966).
[ VOL. 42 :737
LIQUIDATIONS AND REINCORPORATIONS
tion, in substance, redeemed the shares of the second group.7 There-
after the enterprise was reorganized without shifting the remaining
interests of the two groups. The manner in which a type F reorganiza-
tion can be established in these circumstances may be illustrated by the
following example:
Corporation X has cash of $1,000 and operating assets worth $1,000.
Each of its sole shareholders, A and B, owns fifty shares of its stock.
Corporation X transfers one-half its operating assets to two new corpora-
tions (Y and Z) for all shares of each corporation. The $1,000 cash is
distributed to B and the shares of Y and Z are distributed to A in com-
plete liquidation.
Because substantially all assets of Corporation X are not transferred
to a single transferee corporation, the requirements of section 354 are
not met. If the $1,000 distributed to B is not treated as a distribution
separate from the transaction, the requirements of section 355 are also
avoided (Corporation X had assets other than stock or securities of
transferee corporations prior to the liquidating distribution) and there
can be no type D reorganization. If the payment to B is treated as a
redemption separate from the reorganization, however, A becomes the
sole owner of the X stock. The reincorporation will not shift stock
interests and may be classified as a type F reorganization, if the ra-
tionale of Reef is extended to cases where assets are transferred to two
corporations instead of one.
Treating a payment as a distribution separate from the transaction
is significant also in enabling the court to find a type D reorganization.
If, for example, a transaction is not a type D reorganization simply
because the requirements of section 354 are not met and because the
old corporation had assets other than stock or securities of transferee
corporations prior to the distribution, treating a payment as an unre-
lated redemption might enable the court to find that the old corpora-
tion had no assets other than stock of transferee corporations prior to
the distribution. Of course, there might be cases where a transaction
fails to meet the requirements of section 355 because the "separate
active business" requirements of section 355 are not met, and in this
case, it would be necessary to find a type F reorganization.
In summary, use of a type F reorganization to combat the reincor-
th ... [T]wo distinct and unrelated events transpired. First, the holders of 48% of
e stock in Reef Fields had their stock-holdings completely redeemed. Second, new
Reef was formed and the assets of Reef Fields were transferred to new Reef." Id. at
134.
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poration device will be a tool of limited significance, because most
type F reorganizations will also constitute type D reorganizations. 8
Type F reorganizations might be found in certain "division-liquida-
tions" which do not qualify as type D reorganizations because the
"separate active business" and other requirements of section 355 are
not met, but this would seem to be limited largely to cases where the
transferee corporations are new corporations without a pre-existing
tax history and where no outside persons become shareholders of the
new corporations pursuant to the plan of reorganization. Not all
shareholders of the old corporations would have to become share-
holders of the new corporations if part or all of their shares are
deemed to have been redeemed prior to the reorganization, but the
Reef rationale would not apply to a "split-up," where one group of
shareholders of the old corporation obtains the shares of one trans-
feree corporation and a second group of shareholders obtains the
shares of another transferee corporation. Such a situation would in-
volve a shift in proprietary interest which cannot be held to involve a
prior stock redemption.
VI. TAXING REINCORPORATION DISTRIBUTIONS AS Noi AL DIVIDENDS
Despite the "surprising flexibility" 79 of the courts in classifying
reincorporations as reorganizations, some reincorporations escape clas-
"Virtually all F reorganizations also qualify as D reorganizations." Reef Corp.
v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125, 136 (5th Cir. 1966). The Commissioner has ruled (and
argued without success) that transactions not qualifying as type D reorganizations
might nevertheless be taxed as type E reorganization (recapitalizations) or type F
reorganizations (mere change in identity, form, or place of organization), or as a
combination of the two types. In Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 Cum. BuLL. 62, a corpora-
tion with substantial appreciated assets sold all its assets pursuant to a plan of com-
plete liquidation designed to qualify under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 337. The assets
were sold to a new corporation for 45% of the new corporation's outstanding stock,
cash and long-term notes. The remaining 55% of the new corporation's stock was
issued to outsiders. The old corporation then distributed to its shareholders all assets
acquired from the new corporation. Since the old corporation and its shareholders
did not own 80% of the stock of the new corporation and thus lacked "control," there
could be no type D reorganization. The Commissioner ruled, however, that the trans-
action amounted to a type E and F reorganization, with the result that the new cor-
poration took the old corporation's basis in the assets (INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 358)
and the shareholders of the old corporation recognized no gain on the receipt of stock
of the new corporation. Distribution of other property was held to be a "separate
transaction" taxable under § 301. The Commissioner apparently considered this to be
three separate transactions: (1) a separate dividend to the old shareholders; (2) a
recapitalization of the old corporation with the same shareholders; and (3) a subse-
quent issuance of stock to outsiders. Similar arguments in later cases have not been
upheld by the courts. See, e.g., Berghash v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.
1966) ; Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), acq., 1966 INT.
REv. BULL. No. 16, at 5; Book Prod. Indus., Inc., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 339 (1965).
BrrTKER & EUSTIcE, FEDERAL INcom TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 572 (2d ed. 1966).
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sification as a reorganization. Even if the transaction is held to be a
reorganization, taxation under section 356 might be preferable to the
shareholder over taxation under section 301, because of the "dividend-
within-gain" limitations imposed on boot distributions accompanying
reorganizations.80
There are undoubtedly situations-both where the transaction does
qualify as a reorganization and where it does not-in which the pri-
mary motivation is distribution of accumulated earnings and profits
under more favorable circumstances than if the distributions were
made as normal dividends by going corporations. If similar types of
income are to be taxed in the same manner, one might well ask why
these distributions should not be taxed under section 301, whether or
not they meet either the formal requirements of liquidating distribu-
tions, or distributions pursuant to a reorganization. This is the basic
question underlying all reincorporation problems. One answer to the
question is that section 331(b) explicitly provides that liquidating
distributions are not to be taxed under section 301. This means that a
liquidating distribution must either be taxed under section 331 (re-
sulting in possible capital gain treatment) or, if the liquidating distri-
bution is made pursuant to a qualified reorganization, under section
356."1 This answer assumes, however, that the transaction is a liquida-
I INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 356(a) (2). Application of this rule may be illustrated
by an example. If a shareholder exchanges one share of stock with a basis of $85 for
other stock worth $100, cash of $25, and other property worth $50 pursuant to a plan of
reorganization, realized gain is $90, but only $75 is recognized. If the shareholder's
ratable share of available earnings and profits is $30, only $30 of the recognized gain
is a dividend. The remaining $45 is treated as a gain from the exchange of property.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.356-1 (c) (1955), example (1). If the shareholder's ratable share of
earnings and profits were $100 in this example, only $75 would be taxed as a divi-
dend. This "dividend within gain" limitation is cogently criticized in Shoulson,
Boot Taxation: The Blunt Toe of the Automatic Rule, 20 TAx L. REv. 573, 578-79
("If a distribution has the effect of a dividend, it makes no sense to tax the distribu-
tion only to the extent of the gain realized on the reorganization as a whole."). While
recognized gain is treated as a dividend only when it "has the effect of the distribu-
tion of a dividend," INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 356 (a) (2), the Supreme Court has indi-
cated that a gain recognized on a boot distribution is automatically a dividend to the
extent of earnings and profits. Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283(1945). Subsequent cases have thrown some doubt on the validity of this so-called
"automatic rule" (which Shoulson, supra at 573, refers to as "a cannon used to kill a
mouse"). See Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1956); Idaho Power
Co. v. U.S., 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct. Cl., 1958). The Advisory Group on Subchapter C
has recommended reversal of the automatic rule: first, if distributors would other-
xvise qualify for capital treatment under § 302, 303 or 346, they would qualify under§ 356 in a similar manner; second, if the distributions are taxed as ordinary income,
tax would depend solely upon earnings and profits and amount realized, not limited to
the amount of gain realized. U.S. ADvIsoRY GROUP OiT SUBCHAPTER C OF THE INTER-
mu. REv. CODE OF 1954, REVISED REPORT ON CoRpoRATE DISTRBuTIoNS AND ADjUST-
=MNTs 67 (1958).
' See Lane, The Reincorporation Game: Have the Ground Rules Really Changed?
77 HARv. L. REv. 1218, 1227 (1964).
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tion in substance as well as in form; it can be argued that where the
assets of a liquidating corporation are promptly reincorporated there
is no liquidation in substance. Even if the liquidating distribution
does have substance, the distribution might still be subjected to taxa-
tion under section 301 if it is a separate distribution unnecessary and
unrelated to either the liquidation or the reorganization.
There are, therefore, two different arguments the Commissioner
might advance in order to tax a reincorporation distribution as a nor-
mal dividend: first that there is in substance neither a liquidation nor a
reorganization even though the formal requirements of one or both are
met; and second that even though there is a reorganization (or a
valid liquidation without a reorganization), the distribution of property
is unnecessary and unrelated to the reincorporation, and should there-
fore be taxed as a separate transaction under section 301. The regula-
tions under section 331, although vague, appear to authorize the Com-
missioner to advance either argument."2 Published rulings of the
Commissioner do little to eliminate the "infuriating vagueness"" of the
regulation.8 4 There was little doubt that a liquidation distribution
pursuant to a reincorporation could be regarded as part of a reorgani-
zation and thus as "a transaction ... in which gain is recognized... to
the extent of 'other property,' " taxable as ordinary income subject to
the limitations of the reorganization sections, but no court prior to
Davant had held that a liquidation distribution in a reincorporation
12-Treas. Reg. § 1.331(1) (1955):
A liquidation which is followed by a transfer to another corporation of all or
part of the assets of the liquidating corporation may . . . have the effect of a dis-
tribution of a dividend or of a transaction in which no loss is recognized and
gain is recognized only to the extent of "other property." See §§ 301 and 356.
This must be considered in conjunction with Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(1) (1955), as
amended, T.D. 6752, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 84, which provides that a distribution may
be subject to taxation under § 301 even if it is made concurrently with another trans-
action such as a "recapitalization, reincorporation or merger" of an old corporation
into a newly organized corporation with little or no property. The example given in
the regulation indicates that it is intended to cope primarily with the type of situ-
ation present in Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947). That is, a recapitaliza-
tion may be recognized as a reorganization, with the boot distribution taxed under
§ 301 instead of § 356. Treas. Reg. § 1.331 (1) (1955) accomplishes the same result as
that in Bazley, but by a different route. Under Bazley, the distribution might be
taxed under § 301 because the court finds no reorganization. Under the regulation, the
reorganization would be recognized, but the boot distribution would be taxed under
§ 301 as a "separate transaction." (Bazley, however, also contained a dictum that even
if the recapitalization were a reorganization, the distribution might nevertheless be
taxed as a separate dividend distribution. See note 85 infra.) There is little support
for the regulation in the Bazley type situation. There is even less in a liquidation
and reincorporation if the liquidation is recognized, because INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§331(b) provides specifically that distributions in complete liquidation shall not be
taxed under § 301.
' Lane, .supra note 81, at 1228.
" See Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 62.
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could be taxed as a normal dividend under section 301. Formal li-
quidations had always been respected as such, and distributions were
taxed under section 331 unless they could be said to be pursuant to a
plan of reorganization, in which case they were taxed under section
356.
Davant, however, held that a distribution formally qualifying as a
liquidating distribution could be taxed as a dividend under section 301
(rather than section 356). It did this by treating the distributions of
"other property" as "functionally unrelated" transactions which could
be separated from the reorganization and taxed under section 301, and
not by disregarding the liquidation and reorganization. 5
In Davant, it will be recalled, the acquiring corporation paid $700,-
000 to the selling corporation for its operating assets. The selling
corporation then distributed the $700,000 received, plus about $230,-
000, to its shareholders in complete liquidation. In substance this was
a merger of the operating assets of the two corporations. The transfer
of cash from the buyer to the seller was unnecessary for any purpose
since the shareholders of the seller were also the shareholders of the
buyer: except for tax considerations, it was immaterial to the share-
holders whether the seller sold its assets for cash or contributed them
to the acquiring corporation. The Davant court therefore disregarded
the payment of $700,000 by the buyer to the seller, and treated the
distribution of that amount as a direct distribution from the buying
corporation to its shareholders, taxable as a separate transaction under
section 301. The distribution by the selling corporation of its retained
cash earnings was also held to be "functionally unrelated" to the
reorganization."6 Since qualification as a type D reorganization re-
quires that the transferor distribute all of its properties, 7 it is difficult
to see how distribution of $230,000 from the liquidating corporation
could be treated as being "functionally unrelated" to the reorganiza-
-366 F.2d 874, 888 (1966). This was the first judicial recognition of Treas. Reg.§ 1.301(1) (1955), as amended, T.D. 6752, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 84, which provides that a
distribution is within the terms of § 301 "although it takes place at the same time as
another transaction if the distribution is in substance a separate transaction whether
or not connected in a formal sense." The regulation was applied in Rev. Rul. 61-156,
1961-2 Cum. BULL. 62. Some support for the regulation may be found in Bazley v.
Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947). The applicable statute in that case provided that
no gain or loss would be recognized on distributions of debentures pursuant to a
recapitalization. The court implied that where the transaction does not "intrinsically
partake of the elements of reorganization which underlie the Congressional exemp-
tion," distributions pursuant to recapitalizations might nevertheless be taxed as
dividends. Id. at 742. The difficulty is that the court also found that there was no
recapitalization.
366 F.2d 874, 888 (1966).£INT. Ruv. CoDE oF 1954, § 354(b) (1) (B).
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tion.85 If a distribution of all its assets were not required, the selling
corporation could refrain from distributing its cash, and its share-
holders could sell their shares to third parties and treat the proceeds
as amounts received from the sale of a capital asset.5 9 The court in
Davant dealt with this problem by saying that the cash of the seller,
together with its other tax attributes, automatically passed to the buyer
and then was distributed by the buyer as a normal dividend to its
shareholders.9 0
A court that goes as far as did the court in Davant has either
abandoned the statute or distorted the transaction beyond all recogni-
tion. Although reincorporation transactions may lead to abuses with
which the statute was not equipped or designed to cope,9 the existence
of loopholes does not justify distorting reality in order to make a
transaction conform to a taxing statute. In Davant, the cash distri-
butions may not have been essential to the merging of the two busi-
nesses owned by the same shareholders and it was realistic to treat the
distributions as separate from the merger. If reality is to be the touch-
stone, however, the cash distributions should ordinarily be treated as
being made by the corporation that earns, or is the source of, the cash.
'But see Grubbs v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 42 (1962), where the Tax Court found
a type D reorganization even though the requirements of § 355 were not met and even
though the transferor corporation retained many assets and continued its existence.
It has been said of Grubbs that the court found "a 'constructive dividend' of the re-
tained assets to the unredeemed stockholder so that § 354(b) (1) (B) was satisfied."
BITrTr & EusricE, FEDERAL INcom TAxATiox OF CoRoRaToIrs AND SHAMHOLDERS
574 (2d ed. 1966).
The requirements of § 355 might in effect be avoided. However, if the purchas-
ers liquidated the corporation promptly, they might be treated as mere agents of the
original owners, and the liquidation might be treated as part of the original trans-
action. But cf. Sun Properties, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955);
Avco Mfg., Inc., 25 T.C. 975 (1956).
366 F.2d 874, 888 & n.28 (1966).
One commentator has, however, suggested that the statute should be literally
applied and that if this leads to abuse, it is the duty of Congress to correct it. "[A]
distorted broadening of the statutory definitions would cast them into a maze of un-
predictability.... There is nothing wrong with doing what the law allows, and the
law allows capital gains treatment on the complete liquidation of a corporation. If
there is a fault in this, it is a fault of the statute .... [Aittorneys should be able to
rely on a reasonable interpretation of that law which does not torture its language
even though material differences may depend on 'form' more than 'substance."' Grubb,
Corporate Manipulations Under Subchapter C: Reincorporation-Liquidation, 28 U.
CiNc. L. REv. 304, 324, 329, 332 (1959). If courts had respected the form of all liquida-
tions and refused to expand the definition of a type D reorganization, the resultant
abuse might well have led to legislation providing a sounder and more predictable
solution to the "reincorporation" problem than now exists. At the same time, the
courts were faced with a statement of intent by members of Congress that courts had
authority within the existing framework to deal with problems that might arise in
this area. To refuse to exercise or search for that authority when presented with
actual cases might well have been viewed by some judges as an abnegation of judicial
responsibility. See note 40 siupra.
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Therefore, while the $700,000 that originated with the buying cor-
poration could be treated as a direct distribution from the buying cor-
poration to its shareholders, the cash originating with the selling cor-
poration should be treated as having been distributed by that corpora-
tion, and not by the acquiring corporation. 2
The true significance of Davant, however, is not that it combined
the earnings and profits of two corporations in a practical merger
situation, but its willingness to treat a distribution in a reincorporation
as a separate transaction taxable under section 301. In doing so, it
has overruled the previously accepted principles set forth in the ma-
jority opinion in Joseph C. Gallagher.93
In Gallagher, the rule stated was that reincorporation distributions
were to be taxed either under section 331 if there was no reorganiza-
tion, or under section 356 if there was a reorganization. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has recently stated that it "approve[s] the
approach adopted by the Tax Court in Gallagher,"94 but the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals will apparently tax distributions of assets that
are not reincorporated as unrelated transactions taxable under part I
of subchapter C if the same transaction could be effected in the same
way without the distribution. For example, where a shareholder ex-
changes stock of one corporation for stock of another pre-existing cor-
poration in which he previously had no shares and receives cash "to
boot" in a statutory merger, the cash distribution may be a necessary
"This may be illustrated by the following example:
Individual X owns all the stock of Corporation A and Corporation B. Corpora-
tion A has operating assets of an unstated value, and cash of $500. Its earnings
and profits amount to $1,000. Corporation B has operating assets worth $500 and
cash of $500. Corporation B has no earnings and profits. Corporation B sells its
aperating assets to A for $500 and distributes $1,000 to X in complete liquidation.
In substance there has been a practical merger of the operating assets of A and B.
The cash distributions were not a necessary part of that merger. Of the $1,000 dis-
tributed, $500 originated with Corporation A and may be treated as a direct dividend
distribution by A. But should the remaining $500 be treated as a distribution by A
or by B ? If treated as a distribution by B, it will not be a dividend, because B had
no earnings and profits. If treated as a distribution by A, it will be divided. It is
true that if a merger had been effected without a distribution of cash, and if the
$1,000 distribution had been made a year later, the distribution would have been a
dividend to the extent of earnings and profits of the combined corporations. The
earnings and profits account of the two corporations would have been combined. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1965, § 381(c) (2). If, on the other hand, the distribution had been made
by B one year prior to the merger, the distribution would not have been a dividend.
Where the distribution and the merger occur concurrently, it would seem that if $500
could have been extracted without being treated as a dividend if the businesses had
not been merged, it should not be treated as a dividend merely because it accompanies
a reorganization. The reorganization provisions were designed to facilitate mergers
rather than to impede them.
"39 T.C. 144 (1962).
o' Commissioner v. Berghash, 361 F.2d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 1966).
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part of the reorganization,95 but where one shareholder liquidates one
corporation, retains the liquid assets and transfers the operating as-
sets to a new corporation owned solely by him, the cash distribution
is not necessary to the reorganization. There is no reason why the new
corporation could not have received the cash as well as the operating
assets. Where the cash distribution is in fact unnecessary to the re-
organization, the rule set forth in Davant is eminently reasonable. If
the boot distribution is unnecessary, the fact it is pursuant to a plan
of reorganization should not put the taxpayer in a better position than
if the distribution had been made before or after the reorganization.
The only possible justification for the advantages of section 356-the
"dividend-within-gain" limitation-is where a distribution of boot is
necessary to effectuate a reorganization. If a distribution of boot is
taxed under section 301, a man with high basis stock might otherwise
feel inhibited from participating in a reorganization where he will re-
ceive boot but recognize little gain. But where the reorganization can
be effected without the distribution, the "dividend-within-gain" lim-
itation is not needed to remove obstacles to corporate reorganizations
and adjustments.
In summary, boot distributions in reincorporations may now be taxed
under section 301 when a distribution is "functionally unrelated" to a
transaction, and this could occur whether or not the transaction consti-
tutes a reorganization.
A. Determination of When Distribution is "Functionally Unrelated"
to Reorganization
1. Practical Mergers. The recent cases of James Armour, Inc.,
06
Ralph C. Wilson, 7 and Davant"8 illustrate a new kind of reincorpora-
tion which might be called a "practical merger." Two previously exist-
ing corporations are merged in a transaction where the liquid assets of
" Assume that Corporation A has assets worth $7,500 and that Corporation B has
operating assets worth $2,500 and cash in the amount of $7,500. Corporation A wants
the operating assets of Corporation B but not the cash, and is willing to let the share-
holders of Corporation B obtain 25% of the outstanding stock of Corporation A. The
merger can be effected by a prior distribution of cash by B or a merger with
accompanying distribution of cash or other "boot," but it cannot be effected without
some kind of distribution of other property. Hence, a distribution is "necessary" to
the reorganization.
043 T.C. 295 (1964).
'T46 T.C. 334 (1966). In Wilson, a father and son each owned 50% of the stock of
Corporation A and Corporation B. After adoption of a plan of complete liquidation,
A transferred its business to B for cash, sold some investment stock, collected its
receivables and distributed all assets. The court found a type D reorganization and
held both § 331 and § 337 inapplicable.
Is 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966).
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one or both corporations are distributed to the shareholders of one
corporation. Where the relative shareholdings of all shareholders in
each corporation are identical, a cash distribution is unnecessary to
the practical merger. In determining whether interests of each share-
holder in each corporation are identical, it might be appropriate to
apply the stock attribution rules of section 318, so that if a father
owns one corporation and his son owns the second corporation, each
person could be deemed to own the other person's shares for purposes
of determining whether stock interests are identical, but courts are not
likely to do so. 9 Where interests are not identical, "practical mergers"
would probably not qualify as reorganizations under present decisions.
First, type F reorganizations are probably limited to cases where
shareholdings are identical, even under the statements in Davant. °°
Second, type D reorganizations ordinarily require a distribution of
"stock or securities" of the acquiring corporation (except where share-
holdings in both corporations are identical) and no such distribution
can be made where the acquiring corporation pays cash for the assets
of the seller. Thus, where "practical mergers" are held to be reorgani-
zations, taxation of boot distributions under section 301 could become
the rule rather than the exception.
2. Single Businesses. In other types of reincorporations not in-
volving a merger of two separate businesses, it is clear enough that
where each shareholder owns the same percentile interest in the new
and old corporation, the "boot" distribution is not necessary to the
reorganization. But assume that A and B each own fifty per cent of
the stock of X Corporation, which has $20,000 cash and operating
assets worth $10,000. In a liquidating distribution of X Corporation,
A receives $15,000 cash, and B receives the operating assets and $5,000
cash. The operating assets are transferred by B to Corporation Y in
return for all outstanding stock of Y. The transaction may be a type
' Section 318 does not expressly apply in determining "control" under § 368(c).
See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 318(b). In Book Prod. Indus., Inc., 24 CCH Tax Ct.
Mfem. 339 (1965), stock owned by members of a family and trusts for their benefit was
not attributed to the father in determining his interest in a transferee corporation. In
the opinion of one commentator, "it remains to be seen how closely the courts will
scrutinize related parties in determining continuity of ownership." Bromberg, Pitfalls
in Corporate Liquidation, 44 TAxEs 174, 184 (1966).
'1". .. [A] transaction which shifts the ownership of the proprietary interest in a
corporation is hardly 'a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization'
within the meaning of [the predecessor of § 368(a)(1)(F)]". Helvering v. Southwest
Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 202-23 (1942). See Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874
(1966). But cf. Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125, 137 (5th Cir. 1966), where
the court indicated that the complete revision of the Code in 1954 may have weakened
the authority of Southwest Consol. Corp. See text accompanying note 77 mipra.
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D reorganization, but A could probably claim that the distribution to
him is not equivalent to a dividend. 10 1 The distribution of cash to B is
taxable under section 356 unless the distribution was not a necessary
part of the reorganization. It can be said that the cash distribution
to B was not essential because Corporation X could first have redeemed
A's shares in a transaction qualifying under section 302. (This would
in fact be the basis for A's claim that the distribution to him was not
equivalent to a dividend.) B would then have been the sole shareholder
of X and could have reincorporated it without a distribution of cash.0 2
Since the cash distribution is unnecessary to the reorganization, it
could be taxed under section 301.
It is too early to predict how far courts will be willing to go in
treating cash distributions in reincorporation transactions as separate
transactions taxable as normal dividends. But Davant implies that
courts may begin to ask whether the reincorporation could have been
effected in the same manner without the cash distribution to the con-
tinuing shareholders. If it could be effected without such a distribu-
tion, there is little reason to extend the advantages of section 356 to
recipients of distributions merely because the distribution was timed
to coincide with a reorganization.
B. Taxation of Distributions Where the Transaction Does Not
Qualify as a Reorganization
Although the transaction in Davant was held to constitute a reor-
ganization, many reincorporations escape such classification, most
notably where the shareholders of the old corporation wind up with less
than eighty per cent of the stock of the new corporation.0 3 Classifica-
tion of transactions as reorganizations might also be avoided in practi-
cal mergers similar to that in Davant where the shareholders of the
surviving corporation differ from, or have different percentile interests
than, shareholders of the disappearing corporation.0 4 Still another
1 01A has given up his interest in the enterprise completely and is in the same
position as one who has sold his stock. He can also claim that in substance he was
not a party to the reorganization but that all his stock was redeemed by the first cor-
poration. Since the redemption terminated his interest, the transaction would qualify
as an "exchange" of stock under § 302. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b) (3). No
cases in which the Commissioner has sought to tax such terminating distributions
under the reorganization provisions have been found, but in Ralph C. Wilson, 46 T.C.
334 (1966), a shareholder who acquired shares in the transferee corporation and subse-
quently disposed of them was held ineligible for the benefits of § 302 in regard to the
amounts received on the liquidation of the transferor corporation.
" 'Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966).
n See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
.. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
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possibility is a "division-liquidation," where assets of the old corpora-
tion are transferred to two separate new corporations and the require-
ments of section 355 are not met. These transactions all involve liqui-
dating distributions by the old corporation; such distributions of cash
cannot be taxed under the reorganization sections. And, as noted above,
if the distribution is in fact as well as in form a distribution "in partial
or complete liquidation," section 331 (b) provides explicitly that section
301 "shall not apply." There may be two ways to subject such distribu-
tions to section 301.
1. No Liquidation in Fact. The argument that a liquidation in form
is not always one in substance was advanced in Hyman H. Berghash.105
Taxpayer and his wife were sole owners of an old corporation which
transferred all its operating assets to the new corporation for (a) fifty
per cent of the stock of the new corporation, worth $25,000 and (b) a
promissory note from the new corporation in the amount of $96,000.
The remaining fifty per cent of the stock of the new corporation was
purchased by a third party for $25,000. The old corporation then dis-
tributed the stock and the note received by it from the new corpora-
tion, and $49,000 in cash, to its shareholders in complete liquidation.
The taxpayer and his wife claimed (i) that the gain realized on the
transfer of assets from the old corporation to the new corporation
should not be recognized because the sale was made pursuant to a plan
meeting the requirements of section 337 and (ii) that gain realized
upon the liquidation distribution should be taxed as a long-term capital
gain under section 331. The Commissioner argued that even if there
was no reorganization (the shareholders of the old corporation owned
only half the stock of the new corporation and thus did not "control"
it), there was not a "complete liquidation" of the old corporation in
fact because its business was carried on by a successor corporation. 1 6
If there was neither a liquidation nor a reorganization, the property
taken out of the enterprise would have to be taxed as a normal distribu-
tion under section 301. Both the Tax Court and the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the liquidation was not a "reorganization"
and, because there were supporting business reasons it was not a
"sham." Taxation was accordingly governed by sections 337 and 331.
The problems involved in Berghash may be illustrated by a simplified
hypothetical:
-43 T.C. 743 (1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966).Il 43 T.C. at 749, 361 F.2d at 260.
1967]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
A owns all stock of X Corporation, which has operating assets worth
$100,000 and $50,000 cash not needed in the business. The earnings and
profits of X Corporation amount to $80,000. B wants to enter the busi-
ness as owner of one-half the business and A is willing to accept him on
that basis.
It is clear that B could purchase one-half of A's stock for about
$75,000. But if B did so he would be paying $25,000 for an interest
in cash which, if distributed to him, would be taxed as a dividend. As
an alternative, A could cause X Corporation to distribute the $50,000
cash to him, and could then sell one-half his stock to B for $50,000.
However, A might not want to withdraw proceeds which are taxable to
him as dividends. Moreover, the corporation would still have $30,000
of remaining earnings and profits, and B would undoubtedly prefer
buying a business without earnings and profits. For these reasons, the
parties might enter into the following transaction: A causes X Cor-
poration to distribute to him in complete liquidation the $50,000 cash
and operating assets worth $100,000, reporting any gain realized as a
long-term capital gain. He then sells one half the operating assets to
B for $50,000. A and B then transfer the operating assets to a newly
formed Corporation Y in return for all its stock. If the transaction is
not a reorganization, and if the liquidation of the old corporation is not
treated as a sham, the new corporation commences activities with a
basis of $100,000 in its operating assets and no earnings and profits.
It was the Commissioner's position that if the transaction was not a
reorganization, the new corporation should be treated as a mere con-
tinuation of the old corporation. What happened in fact was a dividend
distribution of $50,000 to the first shareholder followed by a sale of
half his stock to the new shareholder for $50,000. Because of the
distribution of cash to the old shareholder, earnings and profits of the
corporation are reduced to $30,000.1°1 No court has accepted this
Io7 The Commissioner's position is based largely on Bazley v. Commissioner, 331
U.S. 737 (1947). "Basically, [the Bazley] case stands as a caveat that dividend treat-
ment may result in any transaction which in substance amounts to no more than a dis-
tribution of earnings." Kuhn, Liquidation and Reincorporation Under the 1954 Code,
51 GEo. L.J. 96, 103 (1962). Although Bazley involved a purported "recapitalization"
and not a liquidation or reincorporation, the analogies are nevertheless striking: the
court in Bazley noted that "recapitalization" is not defined in the statute. Neither is
"liquidation." The Court also noted that a recapitalization in form is not a "recapi-
talization" for tax purposes "unless it partakes of those characteristics ... which
underlie the purpose of Congress in postponing the tax liability," and that a reorgan-
ization, "which is merely a vehicle, however elaborate or elegant, for conveying
earnings from accumulations to the stockholders is not a reorganization ... " Bazley
v. Commissioner, supra at 741, 743. Since the Supreme Court has not spoken on the
"reincorporation!' problem directly, one could at least argue that the principles of
Bazley, i.e., that a transaction must conform to the spirit as well as the letter of the
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position, however, and the Second and Fourth Circuits have indicated
that if there is a business purpose for the transaction, the liquidation
will be respected and if the transaction is not a reorganization, section
331 will apply.10
8
One may assume that there can be a business purpose for bringing
in a new partner, but it is difficult to see any non-tax business purpose
for doing so by reincorporation rather than by a distribution of cash
and sale of stock. A distribution of cash followed by a sale of one-half
the stock in the given example will serve the same purposes as a rein-
corporation, except that the cash distribution will be taxed as a divi-
dend and the corporation will still have an earnings and profits account
of $30,000. The real question, then, is whether the business purpose of
bringing in a new partner is sufficient to justify the tax advantages of
section 331. The transaction might not be effected unless the tax
advantages were offered, and it seems equitable to give these advan-
tages to the purchaser. He should be entitled to buy a business
without having to accept an earnings and profits account of $30,000.
It is less clear whether the seller should receive favored tax treatment
merely because he receives a cash distribution at a time when he re-
leases one-half of his interest in the business to an outsider. These
are difficult judgments of value. It is unclear whether they were
considered in the Berghask case. It would seem in any case that if
there is a business purpose for shifting ownership interests in a busi-
ness, a liquidation used in the process of achieving that shift will be
respected in the Second Circuit and by the Tax Court.
2. Cash Distribution Unrelated to Liquidation. Davant was not con-
cerned with the question of whether or not a liquidation will be disre-
garded as a sham transaction. Davant did, however, consider the
general question of whether a cash distribution can be separated from
the rest of a reincorporation transaction as being "functionally unre-
lated" to it, and its rationale might be applicable even to transactions
not constituting reorganizations. In the hypothetical given above, for
example, it might be possible to say that since there was a business pur-
pose for the reincorporation, the liquidation will be respected as such,
but that the cash distribution will be treated as an independent trans-
action which is "functionally unrelated" to the liquidation. This would
law, and that a transaction which is in substance no more than a distribution of
profits though in form it appears to be something else should he taxed as a distribu-
tion of profits, should be applied to distributions in complete liquidation.
'" See note 106 supra. See also Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th
Cir. 1965), acq., 1966 IzT. Rm. BuLL. No. 16, at 5.
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be somewhat different from disregarding the liquidation entirely in the
given hypothetical, because it would mean that while the cash distrib-
uted to the old shareholder would be taxed as a dividend, the earnings
and profits account of the old corporation would disappear." 9 The
difficulty with treating a cash distribution as functionally unrelated to
the liquidation is that it is necessary to a complete liquidation. The
corporation must either distribute everything or meet the requirements
of section 346 relating to distributions in partial liquidation, and a cor-
poration which only retains liquid assets does not meet the require-
ments of section 346.1 ° It is true that it would be possible for share-
holders to avoid the necessity of distributing the cash in a liquidating
distribution by a prior dividend distribution, but the liquidation cannot
be effected unless all assets are taken out of the liquidating corporation
in some manner. This is a different situation from a reorganization
such as that involved in the Davant case, where the reorganization
could have been accomplished without any distribution of liquid assets.
If necessity is to be the standard by which functional relation is judged,
a distribution of cash and other liquid assets cannot be unrelated to a
distribution in complete liquidation. If distributions are to be taxed as
normal distributions by going corporations in transactions not qualify-
ing as reorganizations, it will be necessary to find that there was no
liquidation in substance: the successor corporation must be treated as
being the same corporation as the corporation which was in form
liquidated.
VII. REINCORPORATIONS BEFORE AND AFTER Davant-A Su m ARY
Prior to Davant, liquidating distributions preceding or following
reincorporations were taxed as true liquidations under section 331
unless the transactions could be designated "reorganizations" as de-
fined in section 368(a)(1). The Commissioner was successful in
categorizing reincorporations only as type D reorganizations. Literal
compliance with the requirements of type D reorganizations was not
required as long as shareholders of the liquidating corporation "con-
trolled" the transferee corporation and if "substantially all" assets of
1
' Assuming, of course, that the transaction is not a reorganization. If the trans-
action is a reorganization, the earnings and profits account of the transferee corpora-
tion are carried over. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 381(c) (2).
' The distributing corporation must continue to operate a separate business, and
the assets distributed in partial liquidation must also constitute a separate business.
The requirements of § 346 parallel those of § 355. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 346.
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the transferor were transferred to a single transferee corporation.
"Substantially all" assets were defined by courts as only those assets
needed to carry on the business of the old corporation, and one court
had held that not even all operating assets need be transferred to the
new corporation if some of the assets are distributed to shareholders
and leased to the new corporation. Although type D reorganizations
require that securities of the transferor corporation be distributed
pursuant to the plan of reorganization, this requirement was ignored as
a "useless act" where both the old and new corporations are owned in
exactly the same way by the same shareholders.
Despite the liberality of courts in finding type D reorganizations,
it was still possible to avoid the reorganization provisions where share-
holders of the old corporation did not control the new corporation.
It also appeared possible to avoid the reorganization provisions in
"sale-liquidation" transactions and practical mergers where there was
some shifting of proprietary interest. If the old corporation con-
ducted two businesses, the reorganization provisions could probably
be avoided by transferring the businesses to two or more separate
corporations for stock, retaining liquid assets and distributing both the
acquired stock and liquid assets in complete liquidation. And where
the reorganization provisions were avoided, courts refused to disregard
formal liquidations or to tax distributions under section 301.
Despite the broad statements in Davant, the case does not appre-
ciably expand the class of transactions which might be categorized
as reorganizations. The court's finding that the "sale-liquidation" in-
volved in the case was a type F reorganization was unnecessary to its
decision because the transaction constituted a type D reorganization
under existing cases. The significance of finding a type F reorganiza-
tion would appear largely limited to transactions involving the division
of an old corporation into two new corporations under circumstances
where the requirements of section 355 are not met.
A second possibility of avoidance under cases prior to Davant arose
out of the "dividend-within-gain" limitations of section 356. In no
case prior to Davant was a distribution accompanying a reincorpora-
tion separated from the transaction and taxed under section 301. As
a result of Davant, it seems reasonable to predict that in cases where
a reorganization could be accomplished without a distribution of ac-
cumulated earnings, the distribution will be subject to taxation under
section 301 rather than section 356.
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VIII. THE NECESSITY OF A NEw APPROACH
The expectation of certain members of Congress that existing prob-
lems in the reincorporation area could be "disposed of" by judicial
decision "within the framework of the other provisions of the bill"'M
has not been fulfilled. The rules adopted by the courts under the
existing statutory structure create as many problems as they solve.
(1) The rules are complex and difficult to understand. (2) The rules
prompt courts to find reorganizations even where the transactions do
not meet the letter of the reorganization sections, in opposition to the
general policy of strict construction of those sections. (3) Even with
a policy of liberal construction of the reorganization sections, classifica-
tion of transactions as reorganizations can be easily avoided where, for
example, shareholders of the old corporation do not end up owning
eighty per cent of the stock of the new corporation. (4) Possibilities
of tax avoidance exist even where transactions are held to be reorgani-
zations. Under cases decided by the Tax Court prior to Davant the
amount of a distribution treated as a dividend could not exceed the
gain realized, nor could the dividend exceed the earnings and profits
of the distributing corporation where profits were milked out of two
corporations in sale-liquidation transactions. The holding in Davant
would modify these rules only where the distribution of boot is "func-
tionally unrelated" to the reorganization, and in "sale-liquidation"
transactions the holding would probably apply only when there is
complete identity of shareholder interest." 2
Disposition of these problems will require either a change in the
approach of the courts or a change in the statute. The first attempts to
solve problems inherent in liquidations and reincorporations were made
in provisions of the House bill of the 1954 Code and in a proposal of
the American Law Institute. The provision in the House bill" 3 con-
cerned only liquidations which are followed by the reincorporation,
within five years, of fifty per cent or more of the operating assets of
the old corporation. If the owners of fifty per cent or more of the
stock of the old corporation wound up with fifty per cent or more of
the stock of the new corporation, the entire transaction would be
treated as a reorganization. The only change of substance from exist-
' STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS ON THE PART OF THE HOUSE, H.R. REP. No. 2543,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954).
'But see text accompanying notes 75 & 76 supra.
' H.R. 8300; H.R. REp. No. 1337, § 357, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
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ing rules was a reduction of the "control" requirement from eighty
per cent to fifty per cent and elimination of the requirement that
"substantially all" assets of the transferor be transferred to the trans-
feree. The provision covered only one type of reincorporation trans-
action and did not purport to cover what are described above as "pre-
incorporation-liquidations" or "sale-liquidations," although it was cer-
tainly capable of judicial expansion. The proposal of the American
Law Institute appears to be largely a reaffirmation of the 1939 Code
and the case law arising under it, except transactions that would
have constituted "reorganizations" under the 1939 law would no longer
be so designated. Property reincorporated pursuant to a reorganiza-
tion would not be taxed; distributions of property not reincorporated
would be taxed in the same manner as normal distributions by going
corporations." 4 It is difficult, and perhaps somewhat moot, to attempt
to judge either the provision in the House bill or the proposal of the
American Law Institute in terms of the 1954 Code because both pro-
posals were based on a statutory framework somewhat different from
that finally enacted.
A proposed statutory amendment within the framework of the exist-
ing Code is contained in the Recommendations of the Subchapter C
Advisory Group."' The Advisory Group has proposed that the "rein-
corporation" problem be disposed of by amending the definition of a
type D reorganization and also by amending the provisions relating
to the taxation of boot distributions pursuant to plans of reorganiza-
tion. The definition of a type D reorganization would be changed first
by excluding any transaction qualifying as a spin-off, split-off, or split-
up under section 355. Type D reorganizations would then include any
other transfers of property of one corporation to another corporation
if (a) the transferor is immediately liquidated and (b) one or more
shareholders of the first corporation end up owning at least fifty per
cent of the stock of the second corporation. Also it would no longer
be necessary that "substantially all" assets of the old corporation be
"'2 A.L.I. FED. INCOME TAx STAT. § X522 (Feb. 1954 draft).
See REVISED REPORT ON Co~'oRAxE DISTRIBUTIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS TO Ac-
COMPANY SUECHAPTER C ADVISORY GROUP PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, As REVISED,
RECEIVED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION AND TRANSMITTED
TO THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS (Comm. Print. 1958). For a comprehensive
discussion, see MacLean, Problems of Reincorporation and Related Proposals of the
Subchapter C Advisory Group, 13 TAx L. REv. 407 (1958). The proposals are embod-
ied in H.R. 4459, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 19, 26 (1959). The proposals are explained
in REVISED REPORT, at 80-81.
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transferred; consequently "division liquidation" transactions as de-
scribed above could no longer escape the reorganization provisions.
To avoid the "automatic rule" of section 356 and the "dividend
within gain""' 6 limitation in transactions that are more similar to
ordinary distributions by going corporations than to distributions ac-
companying other types of reorganizations, an amendment to section
356117 is proposed to provide that in type D reorganizations: (a) no
gain or loss shall be recognized on boot distributions; (b) if the boot
distribution has the effect of a dividend it shall be taxed under section
301; (c) if the boot distribution has the effect of a redemption qualify-
ing under section 302 or 303, it shall be taxed under such section; and
(d) if the boot distribution is in effect one in partial liquidation, it shall
be taxed under section 346. In other respects the proposed amendment
would ratify what courts have done to the existing statute.
The effect of the proposal would seem to be that if a transaction
meets the definitional requirements of section 368(a) (1) (D) as modi-
fied by the proposed amendment, no gain or loss will be recognized as
to the reincorporated property, but property distributed and not rein-
corporated will be taxed under either section 301, 302, 303 or 346.
One might ask why, if distributions are going to be taxed under section
301, 302, 303 or 346, is it necessary to go to the trouble of first cate-
gorizing the transaction as a type D reorganization. Why could one
not simply disregard the transaction as a liquidation and tax the dis-
tributions under the named sections directly? One answer is that
categorizing the transaction as a reorganization permits non-recogni-
tion of gain or loss on property which is left in corporate solution. If
a shareholder who owns one corporation with operating assets worth
$500 and cash of $500 liquidates the corporation and transfers the
operating assets to a new corporation, disregarding the liquidation and
taxing the distribution under section 301 might lead to a claim that
the amount distributed was $1000. Under the proposal, only $500
actually retained by the shareholder is taxed. The non-recognition
provisions of section 356 would apply to the operating assets trans-
ferred to the new corporation. The same result could be achieved by
holding that both the liquidation and reincorporation are without sub-
stance and by treating the new corporation as being the same as the
old corporation for tax purposes. What remains is a distribution of
$500 by a going corporation.
" See note 80 mtpra.
"7 H.R. 4459, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 21 (1959).
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IX. Is LEGISLATION NECESSARY?
The proposals of the Subchapter C Advisory Group-like present
court decisions-assume that abuses in liquidations and reincorpora-
tions can be combatted only by categorizing such transactions as
"creorganizations." One's initial reaction to such transactions, how-
ever, is not that they are reorganizations, but rather that they do not
in substance meet the basic conditions for the special advantages af-
forded by provisions relating to complete liquidations."' In substance,
many liquidations and reincorporations are more similar to current
distributions by going corporations than either liquidating distribu-
tions or distributions pursuant to a bona fide reorganization. Why
then is it not possible to disregard the liquidation and tax the distri-
bution under section 301 or another appropriate section? Why is it
necessary to resort exclusively to the reorganization provisions to
combat the abuse?
Resort to the reorganization provisions is probably thought to be
necessary for the following reasons:
A. It is difficult to establish a test for determining when a liquidation
is a liquidation in substance as well as in form
The tests for determining whether a transaction constitutes a reor-
ganization are fairly precise. Determining whether a transaction is a
liquidation in substance, without the guidelines of sections 368, 354,
355 and 356, might be difficult.
A possible approach would be to use a "continuity of business enter-
terprise" test. Under this test, the price asked of the shareholder for
the special treatment of sections 331 and 337 would be a termination of
the corporate enterprise as a corporation. Continuation of the business,
in corporate form, by any corporation would prevent shareholder use
of sections 331 and 337.111 If the second corporation carries on the
same business as the first, then alteration of shareholder interest would
I""With relatively few exceptions, it is possible to equate the result of decisions
-for or against the taxpayer-with the attitude of the court on whether or not the
distribution should be unmasked as an ordinary dividend." Whitaker, Liquidation and
Reincorporation, U. So. CAL. 1966 TAX IN s. 191.
u' Continuity of business enterprise is not equivalent to continuity of interest.
The latter refers to a continued interest in assets, whether or not the assets are used
in the same business. In Ernest F. Becher, 22 T.C. 932 (1954), aft'd, 221 F.2d 252 (2d
Cir. 1955), for example, there was continuity of interest but no continuity of business.
See note 70 supra. Under existing statutes, continuity of interest is required; con-
tinuity of business is not. But cf. Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th
Cir. 1965) acq., 1966 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 16, at 5. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955)
("Requisite to a reorganization under the Code are a continuity of the business enter-
prise under the modified corporate form, and.., a continuity of interest... ").
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be immaterial. The fact that the transaction would not be treated as a
liquidation need not work a hardship on the shareholders because, if
shareholders have no proprietary interest in the new corporation, they
could obtain advantages similar to section 331 by qualifying for capital
gain treatment under the stock redemption provisions of section 302.
In applying section 302, the second corporation would be treated as
being the same entity as the first, and in determining relative owner-
ship of the old and new corporations, additional capital contributed by
third parties would be disregarded. 2° Determining whether there is
continuity of business enterprise when the business of the old corpora-
tion is transferred to two or more new corporations, 121 or when the
business is transferred to a pre-existing, active corporation, 2 would
I See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §302. Under § 302(b)(2)&(3), a redemption may be
treated as a sale or exchange if the shareholder's interest in the corporation is termi-
nated by the redemption, or if the shareholder's percentile interest after the redemp-
tion is less than 80 % of his pre-redemption percentile interest (if the shareholder owns
less than 50 % of the voting stock after the redemption). Application of this section to
shareholders who obtain no stock interest in the new corporation is simple, but prob-
lems are raised where the shareholder of the old corporation continues an interest in
the new corporation. Assume, for example, that the old corporation has 100 outstand-
ing shares, owned equally by A and B. The corporation is liquidated. A sells his
assets to C. B, C and D then form a new corporation. B and C contribute the assets
of the old corporation for fifty shares each and D contributes cash for an additional
fifty shares. If the shares issued to new shareholders are all disregarded in determin-
ing B's percentile interest in the new corporation, B's percentile interest would never
be reduced. But the question is whether only the shares issued for reincorporated
property should be considered, or whether the shares issued for additional capital
should also be considered. If the shares issued to D in the given example are con-
sidered in determining B's percentile interest in the new corporation, he would
qualify under §302(b)(3); if they are disregarded, he does not qualify. The most
reasonable interpretation would seem to be to disregard shares issued for new capital
invested by parties unrelated to shareholders of the old corporation, but to take into
consideration all shares issued for reincorporated property, even if the shares are
issued to persons other than shareholders of the old corporation. The possibility of
taxing liquidations in liquidation and reincorporation transactions as stock redemp-
tions or redemptions in partial liquidations is mentioned briefly in Grubb, Corpor-
ate Manipulations Under Subchapter C: Reincorporation-Liquidation, 28 U. Circ.
L. REv. 304, 326-29 (1959).
To say that there is no continuity of business enterprise when assets are trans-
ferred to two new corporations would leave open the same loophole that appears to
exist under present law in "division-liquidation" transactions. See notes 74-78 supra
and accompanying text. To hold, on the other hand, that there is a continuity of busi-
ness enterprise in such circumstances might enable shareholders to avoid the require-
ments of IT-r. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 355. A possible solution in such circumstances
would be to provide that where there is continuity of business enterprise, recognition
of gain on reincorporated property will be postponed only where the new corporation
carries on an independent, active business. If, for example, a corporation liquidates,
its business assets are transferred to one new corporation and its investment assets
transferred to another, gain would not be recognized on property transferred to the
first, but property transferred to the second would be taxed under INr. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 301.
'Where assets are transferred to a pre-existing corporation, problems at the
shareholder level would arise in applying INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302. See note 92
supra. If the acquiring corporation is owned by parties unrelated to shareholders of
the first, the additional capital represented by the separate assets of the acquiring
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create additional problems, but if taxation at the shareholder level
were the only matter of concern, these problems could probably be
solved.
While the "continuity of business enterprise" test might be satis-
factory at the shareholder level, it is not a relevant test in determining
tax consequences at the corporate level. "Continuity of business en-
terprise" does not require ownership of stock in the new corporation
by shareholders of the old corporation. If such ownership were re-
quired, it would be necessary to determine what percentage of the
stock of the new corporation should be owned by shareholders of the
old corporation. This is not a function the courts could undertake
without the aid of a statute, and even if a statute did state the re-
quired percentage, the line drawn would probably be arbitrary. For
these reasons, continuity of interest by shareholders is not part of the
test of continuity of business enterprise described above. If contin-
uity of interest by shareholders it not required, a purchase of assets of
one corporation by another corporation followed by a complete liqui-
dation of the seller would not be treated as a complete liquidation for
tax purposes if the assets are reincorporated. Shareholders of the sel-
ling corporation might still qualify for capital gains treatment under
section 302, but if the liquidation is disregarded for all purposes, it
would mean that the tax attributes of the seller, including its earnings
and profits account, would have to be carried over.123 While it might
be argued that any purchaser of the assets of a going corporation
should assume its tax attributes, judicial or congressional acceptance
of such an argument is highly improbable. Any proposal for change
must therefore assume that a corporation owned by persons other than
shareholders of the seller will be able to acquire the assets of the seller
without also acquiring its tax attributes;
B. Under section 301, even property transferred to a new corporation
might be taxed as a normal distribution
If in a purported liquidation distribution a shareholder receives $500
cash and $500 worth of operating assets, and transfers the operating
corporation might be considered in determining whether redemptions of shares of the
shareholders of the old corporation qualify under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b) (3).
Where the pre-existing acquiring corporation and the liquidating corporation are
owned by the same persons, however, the separate assets of the new corporation should
be disregarded in applying § 302(b) (3). If distributions are subjected to the rules of§ 302, the attribution rules of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 318 would be applicable.
" This would follow if the transaction were a reorganization, INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 381, 382, but where there is a reorganization, there is enough "continuity of
interest" to justify the carryover.
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assets to a new corporation, no gain is recognized in respect of the rein-
corporated property if the transaction is categorized as a reorganiza-
tion.124 If the distribution were taxed under section 301, however, it
might be claimed that the entire $1,000 distribution is subject to tax.
To avoid this result, it could be argued that the shareholder has in fact
received only the $500 removed from corporate solution-the second
corporation being treated as the same entity as the first. But such an
argument is inconsistent with the policy that gain is to be recognized
-unless the transaction qualifies as under the reorganization sections,
which are intended to be the sole means to nonrecognition in cases of
corporate adjustments.'25 This policy could be changed, of course, and
it would seem that non-recognition of gain should as a matter of policy
be afforded wherever this is "continuity of business enterprise,"' 26 but
such a change should be made by statute. It could hardly be initiated
by the courts.
X. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Primarily because of tax consequences at the corporate level, one
must reluctantly concede that the current approach of the courts is
the only feasible approach under the present statutory framework,
although it leaves possibilities of abuse and prompts distortion of the
reorganization sections in attempts to combat such abuse. But this
does not mean that the only solution is to amend the reorganization
sections. A far simpler solution might be to amend section 331 to pro-
vide that if, in a distribution in complete liquidation, the same business
or businesses conducted by the old corporation continues, or is re-
sumed, by a different corporation or corporations using substantially
the same assets as those used by the old corporation in the same
business, section 331 shall not apply to the distribution.117 If the dis-
tribution is in pursuance of a plan of reorganization, tax consequences
"' INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §356; Treas. Reg. § 1.331-1(c) (1955).
'See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(c) (1955).
' See Brown, An Approach to Subchapter C, 3 HousE COMMITTEE ON WAYS &
MEANS, 86TH CONG., iST SESs., TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING
THE TAX BASE, 1619, 1621 (Comm. Print 1959), where the author states that "if it
were necessary to choose between extremes, it would seem preferable for the economy
and no great loss for the Treasury to choose the opposite general rule [from recogniz-
ing all gain unless specifically otherwise provided] and, assuming provision for continu-
ity of basis, to recognize gain or loss on the exchange only as the taxpayer received
cash or consumable goods .... "
'Tax consequences at the corporate level would not be affected by such an amend-
ment. Section 337 might also be amended, however, to provide for its nonapplication
where there is "continuity of business enterprise" and where there is continuity of
interest to the extent specifically provided in such amendment.
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to the shareholder would be governed by part III of subchapter C; if
not, the distribution would be governed by the rules set forth in part I.
Such an amendment should also provide that solely for purposes of
applying section 302, the new corporation or corporations should be
treated as being the same entity as the old corporation.
An amendment of this type would mean that unless the shareholder
taxpayers could show the existence of a plan of reorganization, distri-
butions would be taxed under section 301, 302, 303 or 346, as circum-
stances might warrant. For example, taxpayers whose percentile in-
terest in a new corporation is less than eighty per cent of their percen-
tile interest in the old corporation might qualify for capital gains treat-
ment under section 302. Taxpayers whose interest in the new corpora-
tion is more than eighty per cent of their percentile interest in the old
corporation would treat the entire liquidation distribution as a distri-
bution under section 301 unless it could qualify under section 303 or
346, or unless it was a distribution made in pursuance of a plan of
reorganization. Tax consequences at the corporate level would be
determined as they are now, so that a complete liquidation not part of
a reorganization would terminate a corporation's tax attributes even if
there is continuity of business enterprise.
This kind of amendment might restore the reorganization sections
to their proper perspective. Their main function again could be to
provide nonrecognition of gain upon the exchange of stock and se-
curities in corporate adjustments and not as a means of preventing
abuse arising from the reincorporation process. If the reorganization
provisions are restored to their proper role, courts should no longer
find it necessary to employ judicial doctrines to classify transactions
which do not meet the literal requirements of section 368(a)(1) as
reorganizations.
In any event, it is time to end the uncertainty in this area. There
were several loopholes in the 1954 Code which were more apparent
than real, but there are still possibilities of avoidance, however uncer-
tain. It is difficult to agree either that "substance is plainly triumphing
over form, '12-" or that "the courts have adequately policed this field by
using a rule of reason.' -9 Remaining loopholes may well be closed by
ingenious, if strained, interpretations of the statutes by courts. But to
" Bromberg, Pitfalls in Corporate Liquidation, 44 TAXES 174, 185 (1966).
'Statement of Mr. Cohen, Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and
Means on Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapters C, J and K of the
Internal Revenue Code, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 414 (Comm. Print 1959).
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say that courts may close loopholes is not a satisfactory answer to the
problem. We do not deny taxpayers the right to take advantage of real
loopholes.' To hold out an apparent loophole and then to rule that
it does not exist is not entirely fair to the taxpayer who acts in reliance
on the apparent loophole. Many taxpayers who engage in reincorpora-
tion transactions would probably not have done so had it not been for
their reliance on a poorly drafted statute. The excuse for the detail of
subchapter C is that it promotes predictability, but there is little more
predictability in the area of reincorporations' 3 ' now than in 1940,
when Randolph Paul remarked that "There is something wrong with
provisions which remain so obscure, in spite of filigree detail in the
statute and the regulations, that hardly any prediction as to their
meaning can be made without the feeling that it is little better than a
dignified guess. '
'See Grubb, Corporate Manipulations Under Subchapter C: Reincorporation-
Liquidation, 28 U. Cixc. L. REv. 304, 329 (1959).
' Predictability has been made even less certain by the Commissioner's refusal
to give rulings in cases where shareholders of the liquidating corporation receive
more than a nominal amount of stock of the transferee corporation. Rev. Proc. 64-31,
1964-2 Cum. BULL. 947. It is still true that reincorporations "provide a field day for
the advocate, but a nightmare for the planner." Kuhn, Liquidation and Reincorpora-
tion Under the 1954 Code, 51 GEo. L.J. 96, 119 (1962).
PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, 164 (3d Ser. 1940). Mr. Paul was refer-
ring to the reorganization provisions in general and not specifically to the problem
of reincorporations.
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